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PREFACE 
Iraq has always been a country whose activities and actions iiave 
impacted all its neighbours in the Gulf region. Its natural wealth, if 
optimally exploited, can bring great benefit to the Iraqi people. It is also 
a country that can contribute to regional stability and economic 
prosperity. A stable Iraq under a legitimate and stable Government has 
the potential to be a positive force in the Middle East. Iraq is one of the 
largest reservoirs of oil in Persian Gulf region. The strategic and 
economic importance of Iraq increased along with the rising importance 
of petroleum in the world economy. 
Iraq since ages had been under different rulers and dynasties. The 
Ottomans ruled Iraq till 1914 after which it came under the mandatory 
authority of the British Empire. In 1932 Iraq gained independence after 
a long struggle against the British Empire but the real power rested with 
the Britishers and it was in 1958 that Iraq got complete freedom from 
Britishers. From 1958 till 1979 there were several changes in the 
administration of Iraq, which witnessed the changing of monarchy into 
dictatorship. Not only, this during this period Saddam Hussein made his 
position very strong and ultimately compelled Ahmad Hasan al Bakr to 
resign in 1979. In 1979, Saddam Hussein took over the Presidentship of 
Iraq and in 1980 launched a war against Iran which continued till 1988. 
In 1990-91, the Gulf crisis broke out when Iraqi forces crossed 
into Kuwait and captured it on the basis of historical claims. However, 
the international community did not entertain this act of aggression by 
Iraq on Kuwait. As a result US led coalition forces took action against 
Iraq and liberated Kuwait in 1991. With this disintegration of Soviet 
Union in 1991, US emerged as a sole super power in International 
politics. The end of Cold War has entirely changed the political 
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landscape of International relations from where the US adopted and 
operated policy of containment of Soviet Union till 1991. After the end 
of Cold War, realizing the growing power of Iran and Iraq US adopted a 
policy of dual containment. This policy states the US determination to 
weaken Iran and Iraq militarally, economically and politically. 
Assuming power in January 2001 the US President George W. Bush 
decided to take action against Iraq on the pretext of WMD. 
Subsequently, US invaded Iraq on March 2003 stating the reason that 
Iraq has failed to abandon its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons 
development programs that were considered to be in violation of the UN 
Resolution 687. Another reason given by US for invasion was to 
overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein from power to bring 
democracy and stability in Iraq. 
The war of 2003 turned the entire situation of Iraq critical and 
murky. The war in Iraq 2003 that led to the toppling of Saddam Hussein 
has received mixed reaction and international controversy and placed the 
politics of Iraq in international affairs as crucial and significant. The 
9/11, 2001, event in US have dramatically changed the political matrix 
of international system. 
The current study entitled "Iraq: A Study of Changing Political 
Dynamics Since 2001" explores different dimensions of Iraq and its 
internal and external elements which particularly emerged after 2001. 
The dissertation also attempts to provide a detailed description of events 
leading to the war of 2003 and the internal and external political 
conditions of Iraq since 2001. It seeks to unfold the underlying reasons 
for unstable political situation in Iraq and the role of various political 
dynamics since 2001. 
This dissertation offers to examine the role played by the internal 
political dynamics such as Kurdish problem, Shia-Sunni tension and 
other factors which greatly influence the political affairs of Iraq. This 
study also focuses on the behaviour of Iraq as an independent country at 
regional and international level. It seeks to analyse the reactions and 
response of Iraq on September I I , 2001, the issues of WMD in Iraq and 
US unilateral action on Iraq in 2003. 
The study attempts to show the role of US in Iraq before and after 
2003. The central aim of the dissertation is to highlight the major 
political dynamics of Iraq, which have emerged since 2001 till the war 
of 2003 and thereafter. Another aim is to point out the impacts of war on 
Iraqi people and its changing political system. It was necessary to make 
a detailed study on this issue because the general public domain must 
also understand the present political situation of Iraq, as how the 
political instability in Iraq is hampering its development and causing 
impediments in proper functioning of the government. This work also 
highlights the problems of Iraqi people, the condition of minorities and 
other external political dynamics and forces in Iraq and US as pre-
eminent political factor since 2003. This work highlights the reactions 
of US since 9/11, against Iraq and reasons for attacking Iraq in 2003. 
This study is divided into four Chapters and a Conclusion, which 
gives a detailed description about the internal and external political 
dynamics of Iraq since 2001. 
Chapter first deals with the historical and political background of 
Iraq. The attempts are made to provide a brief history of Iraq from the 
Mongol invasion till the coming up of Saddam Hussein as leader in 
1979. In this chapter, the rule of Ottomans i.e. from 1516-1955 is 
described in a comprise manner, detailed study of Iraq and mandatory 
authority under League of Nations (1914-1932) is done. This chapter 
discusses the Revolution of 1920, which made Iraq an independent 
country in 1932. This chapter covers the regimes of King Faysal, Bakr 
Sidqi, King Ghazi Rashid Ali al Gaylani, Abd al Karim Qasim, Abd al-
Salam Arif, Abd al-Rahman al Bazzaz, and Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr. It 
provides detail information about different coups that originated in Iraq 
in different years. It also provides a description on how the monarchy 
changed into dictatorship since 1958 to 1979. It gives an account of the 
evolution and elaboration of the Ba'th Party and the coming of Saddam 
Hussein as a leader by replacing Ahmad Hasan al-Bark in 1979. 
Chapter two deals with the situation of Iraq under Saddam 
Hussein, the period covers from 1979 to 2000. The attempts are made to 
provide a detailed study of the behaviour and policies of Saddam 
Hussein towards Iraq at national and international level. The chapter 
also deals with the war of 1980-88 (the Iran-Iraq War), its consequences 
and implications and resolutions passed by UN after the war. This 
chapter also covers the Gulf War of 1990-91, the course of war, the 
basic reason behind the war, the role UN played in the Gulf War of 
1990-91, and also the role of US and UN from 1990-91 to 2000 in Iraq. 
The Chapter three deals with the period between 2001 and 2003, 
when President George W. Bush came to power and declared Iraq as an 
enemy country. His first and foremost motive was to topple the regime 
of Saddam Hussein from Iraq. In this chapter, attempts have been made 
to unfold the tension between the US and Iraq on issued like WMD, and 
oil. This chapter gives a detailed study on the internal and external 
political dynamics since 2001. It deals with the reaction and response of 
Iraq to 9/11 attacks and the war on Afghanistan by US which led to the 
serious animosity between Iraq and US. The chapter highlights the role 
of US as a major political dynamic, which to a great extent impacted on 
the internal and external affairs of Iraq before and after the war of 2003. 
The chapter also highlights the situation changed after 9/11 and factors 
which compelled US to launch a war against Iraq in 2003. 
The Chapter four examines the main reasons of rivalry between 
US and Iraq that led to the war of 2003. This chapter throws light on the 
points that how US was able to maintain its hegemonic power, tried to 
curb the regime of Saddam Hussein. US had its own personal motives in 
attacking Iraq. This chapter analyses the extent to which the different 
strategic concepts of deterrence, prevention and compellence are 
reflected in current US strategies. This chapter also examines the 
connection between the war in Iraq in 2003 and the issues of WMD and 
international terrorism. In this chapter complete picture of the war of 
2003 is presented, how the war was fought, what were its consequences, 
what was the role of internal factors in the war of 2003, and what role 
did UN played in Gulf crisis of 2003. Answers to all such questions are 
given immense importance in this chapter. The chapter four, also 
provides a study on the present situation of Iraq, the condition of 
minorities in Iraq and shows a need of responsible government in Iraq. 
In concluding remarks the study unfolds the main reasons that led 
to the Gulf War of 2003. The conclusion also gives a brief information 
about the main motive of US before and after the Gulf War of 2003. It 
discusses the present situation of Iraq and how the US was solely 
responsible for making the condition of Iraq so uncertain and unbridled. 
The conclusion made in this dissertation also present the clear picture of 
the aims and agenda of US in invading Iraq, despite knowing that Iraq 
was not having any WMD. 
The conclusion attempts to unfold the strategies of US from 1990 
till 2010, on how it tried tooth and nail to gain control over Iraq for its 
own interests. It was not the question of democracy, but just to prove 
itself the most powerful in the world, US invaded Iraq. The US also 
wanted to warn the entire world that US national interest is utmost 
important and whoever tries to come in between the interest of US they 
will be dealt ruthlessly by every means including use offeree. 
CHAPTER - 1 
Iraq: A Historical and Political Background 
Iraq is encircled by Saudi Arabia on the south, Turkey on the 
north, Syria and Jordan on the west and Iran on the east. The actual 
frontier lines present one or two unusual features. In the first place, 
there exist between Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia a 'neutral zone', 
rhomboidal in shape, which was devised to facilitate the migration of 
pastoral nomads, who cover great distances every year in search of 
pasture for their animals and who moves regularly between several 
countries. Hence the closing of frontier could be a matter of life and 
death for them. Secondly, the Iraqi frontier with Iran in its extreme 
southern portion, below Basra, follows the course of Shatt al-Arab 
channel, which flows into Persian Gulf, but from 1936 till March 1975 
the frontier was at the left (east) bank, placing the whole of the river 
within Iraq. But, this situation was not acceptable to Iran, and under the 
Algiers Agreement of March 1975 the border was restored to the 
Thalweg line in the middle of the deepest shipping channel in the Shatt 
al Arab estuary. Iraq has always been a country whose activities and 
exploits to a great extent have impacted the countries of the Arabian 
Gulf. It is a country where God has gifted natural wealth in abundance; 
It is having the largest reservoirs of oil resources in the Persian Gulf. 
Iraq's rich oil resources became the bone of contention between many 
countries and also proved a major cause for many wars like Iran-Iraq 
war of 1980-88, Gulf war of 1990-91 and War of 2003. Iraq was also 
once the centre of Assyrian, Babylonian, Abbasid, Parthian, Akkadian, 
Sassanid, Ummayyad and Mongol Empire. The authority of "Abbasid 
Caliphate'", under which Baghdad had become commercial, political, 
intellectual and spiritual capital of the Islamic world had begun to 
decline as early as the tenth century as Iraq passed into the hands of 
Mongols in 1258. In the next two centuries it was first ruled by Mongols 
and then by formidable Timur who died in 1405.' The next century and a 
half saw the succession of different rulers of Turkic origin, the two 
Turcoman confederations (the black sheep and the white sheep) until in 
the year 1499 - 1508. The white sheep regime was destroyed by Safavid 
Ismail, who made himself Shah of Persia. But soon Ottomans took over 
Mosul and Kurdistan from Safavids in 1516 and added Basra and 
Baghdad to their territories in 1955 - 56.^ 
Iraq and Ottoman Rule 
Although Ottomans conquered Iraq in the sixteenth century but 
their control over the area was gradual & sporadic. The extent and 
intensity of Ottoman control varied considerably over the centuries. By 
1704, Ottoman control lapsed, this time in favour of Mamluk dynasty 
that ruled Baghdad and much of the rest of 'Iraq' until 1831, when an 
Ottoman army tried to defeat them and the process of re-integrating or 
perhaps more accurately integrating Iraqi provinces into the empire 
began. Therefore, Iraq like many other parts of the empire enjoyed 
relative, administrative, economic and fiscal autonomy for much of the 
period between the original conquest and the mid-nineteenth century. 
The three provinces of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul were known as 
Wilayet, at the summit of the system of powers in the three provinces 
stood the military alike of Mamluk Pashas who acknowledged the 
sovereignty of Ottoman Sultan, but were increasingly beyond his 
control. These Mamluk Pashas ruled over a tributary system where main 
function of the government was to maintain proper revenue system 
which could further enable the serve their clients and to defend the 
system against internal and external challenges.. 
The inhabitants of these three provinces provided a broad 
platform of social and communal structures as anywhere in the Ottoman 
Empire. In the Kurdish speaking areas of the north, north east of Musul 
and Baghdad, dynastic, parochial and tribal indentities shaped the lives 
of the inhabitants. In Arabic speaking areas of Mosul province, the rural 
population was divided among sedentary and nomadic tribal groups."^ 
Baghdad, like Mosul ruled over a province that was only 
nominally under the control of authorities in the capital. A series of 
Mamluk Pashas in the eighteenth century engaged in war with Persia 
and, towards the end of the century, had to contend with Kurdish 
insurrection in the north and raids by Wahabi tribesmen from the south. 
In the early nineteenth century the Ottoman Sultan decided to regain 
direct possession of Iraq. Sultan Mahmud II sent All Rida Pasha to 
perform this task in 1831. A severe outbreak of Plague was deposed, and 
the Mamluk regiments were exterminated.^ 
The arrival in Baghdad of a Forceful and energetic Midhat Pasha 
as governor in 1869, decisive steps were taken to implement both the 
Land Law of 1858 and Vilayet Law of 1864. Midhat Pasha was able to 
introduce these reforms with little difficulty in this particular area. In 
other areas - and under Sultan Abdul Hamid II - specifically the Saniya 
lands, the practice of Iltizam or tax-farming continued, leading to 
periodic auctions of the tax farming rights and denying the peasants the 
possibility of establishing the kinds of stable tenancies that would allow 
successful application for title to the lands. Attempts were made to 
enforce the new law, often f resisted by the cultivators themselves, since 
the new principles conflicted with the rights recognized for years under 
various forms of customary practices. Hostility was sharpened in many 
cases by the fact that those who registered as owners of the title deeds 
were wholly unconnected with the cultivators of the land. Rather, they 
had used their influence or the capital they had accumulated within the 
urban administrative and trading works as state servants, merchants or 
otherwise well connected individuals, to secure for themselves rights 
over the land.^ 
The End of Ottoman Rule 
During the period between 1839 and 1876, the notion of 
Ottmanism, Osmanlilik, according to which all citizens of the empire, 
irrespective of whether they are Muslim or Christian, Arab, Greek or 
Turk, were to be regarded as equal before the law, had been promoted 
fairly consistently by the Tanzimat reformers^ and in 1876 a constitution 
and parliamentary form of government had been introduced. During the 
long region of Abd al Hamid II (1876-1909) these general liberal 
tendencies were put into abeyance and replaced by a return to a more 
autocratic and despotic style. At the same time, Arabs formed a distinct 
ethno linguistic entity and ultimately, demanded for some form of 
autonomy within the empire. This was the beginning to exert an 
important influence on Arab intellectuals, and the more repressive 
aspects of 'Abd al Hamid's rule gradually gave increasing currency and 
respectability in the Arab provinces.^ In 1880's, the main opposition to 
the "new despotism' came from the loose coalition known generally as 
the Young Turks, which consisted of a number of protest groups 
scattered throughout the empire and in exile in Europe.^ The committee 
of Union and Progress, founded in 1887, which largely consisted of 
many officers, became most important of these groups, with branches in 
Paris, Geneva, Cairo and London.''' A number of Arab secret societies 
were founded in various parts of Empire. One of these at Al Ahd 
founded by 'Aziz' Ali al Misri' in 1914, was dominated by number of 
Iraqi officers, many of whom were to become leading politicians under 
the mandate and monarchy, including Nuri al-Said, Jafar al-Askari, 
Yasin Al-Hashmi, Jamil Midfai, Naji Shawkat, Maulud Murkhlis and Ali 
Jawdat." 
Iraq and Mandatory Authority Under League of Nations 
(1914-1932) 
On 3'^ '' November 1914, the Ottoman Empire formally made an 
alliance with Germany, and declared war on Britain and France two days 
later.'^ On 6"^  November,1914, an advance party of Indian Expeditionary 
Force 'D ' landed at Fao,and thus beginning the Mesopotamia Campaign, 
which was eventually to wrest from the Ottoman empire the whole of 
Turkish Arabia, at the wilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul were then 
known in British official circles, and to lay, the foundations of the 
Kingdom of 'Iraq'.'^ Britain took over Basra on November 22,1914, and 
advance to Qurna, some 100 miles up the Shatt al Arab, by December 
9,1914, which seems to have produced a sense of Euphoria that was to 
have serious consequences.'"* British troops captured Baghdad in March 
1917, and in early 1918, Kirkuk some 200 miles north of Baghdad, was 
taken and three days after the armistice of Mudros, Mosul also fell into 
the British hands.'^ Between October 1918 and April 1920, many 
former members of Al-Ahd were running the Arab Kingdom of Syria, 
under Faisal Ibn Husayn, with whom they had served in the Arab Revolt 
in the Hijaz, while Iraq was still being ruled by British officials. Thus, it 
was clear that British judged the Arabs competent to run their own 
affairs on one side of the fertile cresent but not on the others, a situation 
that was particularly paradoxical since so many members of the Syrian 
administration were Iraqi. In British Mesopotamia, on the other hand, in 
the words of one official, 'any idea of an Arab state is simply blood 
stained fooling at present.''^ 
In April 1920, the mandates were shared out between Britain and 
France, and France was awarded Syria and Lebanon and Britain got Iraq, 
Palestine and Transjordan. But very soon British rule was opposed and 
eventually turned up into a widespread rising known as the Revolution 
of 1920, which engulfed the southern and central parts of Iraq for most 
of summer and autumn of that year. 
The Revolution of 1920 
The Revolution of 1920 is significant as it was the first manifestation 
form of Iraqi national identity. It had taken place at a time when 
Britain's policies in the Middle East as a whole were being subjected to 
considerable domestic criticism on grounds of their heavy handedness 
and expenses.'^ A special sub-department of the colonial office was 
setup and a conference was organized in Cairo in March 1921, where 
Churchill, the then colonial secretary laid down new guidelines. For 
Iraq, it was decided that direct rule by British officials should be 
abandoned in favour of indirect rule through an Iraqi government and 
civil service, backed up by a small but powerful corps of British 
'advisers' whose advice has to be taken. Britain was to control Iraq's 
foreign relations and also have the right to veto in military and financial 
matters. 
The new government was to be headed by the Arab ruler, and for 
many reasons, Faysal Ibn Hussein was regarded as an obvious candidate 
for the post.'** Fortunately for Faysal, the only other serious candidate, 
Sayyid Talib of Basra, effectively queered his own pitch in mid April by 
veiled threats of a tribal uprising if the elections to the throne were not 
carried out fairly. He was arrested and deported the next day.^ ** In 
August 1921, Faysal was duly installed as king, and a national 
government was formed. It was decided that relations between Britain 
and Iraq should be regulated by an Anglo-Iraqi treaty, an instrument that 
would embody the terms of the mandate. It took over a year for the 
treaty to be accepted by the new Iraqi cabinet, and took two years more 
to be ratified by the Constituent Assembly, neither body was particularly 
anti British, but the pretence that the treaty was an agreement freely 
entered into between equals was too transparent for many to swallow.^' 
By the middle of 1920's an informal arrangement had grown up between 
the government and the larger landowners, whereby, in return for their 
support, they would largely be left to their own devices as far as the 
administration, taxation and policing the their local area was 
concerned. 
By the middle of 1924, a certain impasse had been reached in 
Anglo-Iraqi relations, partly because Britain had not been able to secure 
Mosul definitely for Iraq at the Lausanne conference. Furthermore, a 
lively 'Quit Mesopotamia' campaign raging between 1922 and 1924 in 
the British Press, whose owners were apprehensive about the dangers 
posed by the revival of Turkish military strength and apparently 
unaware of the considerable potential of Mosul oil. After several 
months of stalemate, the High Commissioner threatened to suspend the 
constitution in June, in order to bully the deputies into forming quorum 
to produce the desired result.'^'' The League of Nation's Arbitration 
Commission soon decided in July 1925, that Mosul should be awarded 
to Iraq, on the condition that the mandatory regime should continue for 
twenty five years or until Iraq become a member of League of Nations. 
By September 1929, Britain had greed to recommend Iraq for League of 
Nations membership in 1932. Britain insisted on maintaining the RAF 
in Iraq to ensure the security of imperial communication and on the 
assurance that all foreign officials should be British. In 1930, a new 
Anglo-Iraqi treaty was drawn up, designed to come into force when Iraq 
entered into the League of Nations in 1932. It become very clear to the 
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Iraqi people between that Iraqi government was not fulfilling its promise 
made during the time of election and it was not prepared to make any 
binding commitments in the direction of implementing the various 
administrative and educational measures that it had promised to 
introduce into Kurdish areas. In these circumstances, it was hardly 
surprising that the country's passage from mandated territory to 
independent state, which took place on 3"* October 1932, occasioned 
little excitement among the people of Iraq. Since, however, 
distinguished British power and influence, it was widely believed by 
many Iraqi people that they were not the true masters of their country. 
The end of mandate gave free hand to the small group of Sunni officials 
and ex-sharifian Officers gatherd around king Faysal, to exercise 
control within the country, but in actual practice it was the British 
power which maintained supreme authority and the vast majority of 
population was kept aloof in any participation in the government.^^ 
Period from 1932 - 1946 
Iraq was then officially the independent state represent, to a great 
extent, a continuation of the mandate, in the sense that overall control of 
the country still rested with Britain. But the political arena continued to 
be occupied by the same group of people who have become prominent in 
the 1920s and their close friends and associates. After the premature 
death of king Faysal in 1933 and the succession to the throne of his 
rather flamboyant son Ghazi (1933-1939) was the emergence of the 
armed forces, as a new locus of political powers, although in many ways 
this development was more a change of style than of substance.^^ In 
October 1936, taking advantage of the unpopularity of the government 
of Yasin Al-Hashimi, and encouraged by king Ghazi's own desire to get 
rid of Al-Hashimi's influence, the army under its acting Commander in 
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Chief Bakr Sidqi seized power after staging a military coup. One of the 
first acts of Sidqi's, Prime Minister, Hikmat Sulayman, after forming his 
cabinet, was to send a message to the British ambassador assuring him 
that the new government wished to maintain the cordial relations with 
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Britain which had been enjoyed by its predecessors. 
For next four years, until the spring of 1941, government was 
made and dismissed according to the wishes of the officers. The 
situation became complicated by the death of King Ghazi in April 1939, 
and the nomination of his pro-British cousin, Abd al-Ilah, as regent for 
Ghazi's four year old son Faysal, and further exacerbated by the 
outbreak of the Second World War. Britain's most prominent supporters 
were the Regent and Nuri al- Sa'id. The most prominent opponents 
were Rashid Ali al Gaylani and his circle who enjoyed the support of a 
powerful faction officers known as the Golden Square. Many of the 
officers were attracted towards various forms of Pan-Arab nationalism a 
body of ideas that enjoyed considerable influence in certain parts of 
Iraq, although more so in other Arab countries, during the inter-war 
years. After the collapse of authority of the Iranian government in most 
parts of the country in the wake of Anglo-Soviet invasion in 1941, 
Mahabad a small town in Iranian Kurdistan just south of lake Urmiyya 
gradually developed into the headquarters of the movement for Kurdish 
autonomy and gained impetus in October 1944 when leading citizen and 
judge Qadi Muhammad of Mahabad joined it. In the autumn of 1945, 
Qadi Muhammad and his associates in Mahabad founded the Kurdish 
Democractic Party, and almost at the same time Mulla Mustafa Barzani, 
(younger brother of the Barzani religious and tribal leader Shaykh 
Ahmad, who emerged as a principal figure in Iraqi Kurdish politics) and 
his followers were preparing to enter Iran from Iraq.^ *^ Qadi Muhammad 
and his colleagues were forced to surrender to the Iranian army on 16 
December, 1946. Barzani meanwhile decided to abandon the cause of 
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Mahabad, and made an unsuccessful attempt to come to term with 
Iranian government through the good offices of the British embassy in 
Tehran. At the same time a number of political parties were licensed in 
Iraq in 1946.^" 
The Last Phase of the Monarchy (1946-1958) 
The events of the post war years were of paramount importance in 
consolidating opposition to Britain and the monarchy in Iraq. Under the 
ministries of Hamdi al-Pachachi and Tawfiq al-Suwaidi between 1944 
and 1946, a total of sixteen labour unions, twelve of which were 
controlled by the communists were granted licences.^' 
In other major British - directed concern, the IPC, based in 
Kirkuk permission to form a union was rejected and workers went on for 
strike for higher wages in July 1946. After nine days, the workers were 
gathering to hear a report from the strike committee, they were suddenly 
attacked by armed police and ten workers lost their lives. This tragic 
incident was a foretaste of the terrible violence of 1948, the year of the 
great national rising known as Al-Wathba. The immediate cause of this 
mass massacre of the current status quo and the whole governmental 
system was the so called Portsmouth Agreement, Britain and Iraq in 
1947-48 ,negotiated an Agreement ,which if implemented, would have 
had the effect of prolonging the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1948 for a further 
twenty years, or, in Batatu's words of 'extending the treaty under the 
- 1 - 1 
guise of revising it'. The anxieties expressed by some British officials 
in 1946 and 1947 were temporarily allayed when Iraq's first Shi'a Prime 
Minister Salih Jabr, took office after the elections of March 1947. 
Elections were held again in 1948, which coincided with the beginning 
of the war in Palestine, which aroused further strong anti-British feeling 
in Iraq, to the extent that martial law was introduced in autumn that 
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year. Nuri took over the premiership once again in January 1949, after 
having seen the Iraqi army's withdrawal from its forward position in 
Palestine. In the morning of 14 and 15 February 1949, Fahd the first 
secretary of communist party, and two members of the politburo, were 
hanged in public in Baghdad, because they continued to organize the 
party, while in prison. Their bodies were left hanged for several hours so 
that the common people would receive warning.'''' A National 
Development Board was established in 1950, but the activities of the 
board were quite insufficient to hold back the high tide of discontent 
arising in Iraqis. It concentrated mainly on flood and irrigational 
control, communication and construction, the kinds of large scale 
projects , however sensible, could not produced immediate and visible 
results. It was believed that whatever the ultimate benefits of industrial, 
agricultural or irrigational projects, the most obvious spin-offs were the 
rich pickings which went to those fortunate enough to be awarded the 
contracts.•'•^ In 1953, Faysal II turned eighteen, but the Regent, who was 
unwilling to lose the control, did not step back and continued ruling as if 
nothing had changed. Abd al-Ilah, planned to hold free parliamentary 
elections in June 1954, in which he hoped would produce good number 
of deputies in his arch. In May 1954 three main political parties the 
National Democrates, the Istiqlal and the Communist^^, had agreed to 
join together in a National Front, a unique and potentially influential 
political alliance, which won eleven out of 135 seats in the election of 
June 1954. On the other hand, Nuri's diplomatic activities in 1954 and 
1955 resulted in the conclusion of Baghdad Pact in February 1955. In 
Egypt, Nasser's reaction to the new western sponsored defense 
agreement for the Middle East was predictably hostile this vigorous 
denunciation of the pact, and his triumphant emergence as an 
international figure at the Bandung conference in 1955, served to 
enhance his status, strengthening his claim to be the leading 
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representative of a new kind of Pan-Arabism, which soon become very 
popular in Iraq and in other parts of the Arab world. In this 
atmosphere, Suez Canal crisis of 1956 further worsened the condition in 
Iraq, because there were huge demonstrations in Baghdad and other 
cities. 
By the end of 1956, the Iraqi regime was out of step with the 
government of almost all the Arab states and the humiliation caused by 
this isolation was compounded by almost universal dissatisfaction with 
the slow rate of material progress and the absence of civil liberties. The 
most senior army officers in the late 1950s were still closely associated 
with the regime through ties of family, friendship or material interest, 
but the younger generation reflected totally different views and wanted 
to change political trends. A second national opposition front was 
formed in February 1957, which included the National Democratic 
Party, the Isqtiqlal and the Communist, and the Ba'th Party, the Iraqi 
branch of a Pan-Arab organization founded in Syria, which also had 
some 300 members in Iraq in 1955.^^ It was a group of free officers, a 
secret organization within the military, which brought about the coup 
which become the revolution of 14 July, 1958. 
Military Coup and Revolution of 1958 And After 
The Revolution of 1958 was almost universally welcomed by the 
people of Iraq. It was a time of great hope and optimism for the future. 
The original organizational structure of the free officers (who believed 
that if they liberate their country from Britain everything else would 
somehow fall naturally into place) cannot be traced with any precision 
before 1956. Although a number of discontented officers had been 
meeting secretly since 1952. The movement attracted many adherents 
after the accession of Iraq to the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and even more 
after the tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956. In December 1956, a 
supreme committee of the free officers was formed, all of whom were 
army or air force officers. But, at this stage supreme committee did not 
include two men who were eventually to emerge as the prime movers of 
the group, Abd al-Karim Qasim and Abd al-Salam Arif, both of whom 
were stationed at Jordan. Qasim was member of another group of free 
officers, but soon Qasim's group and supreme committee was merged in 
1957. It was decided by the free officers to launch a military coup 
against the government and the execution of coup was decided by Arif 
and Qasim on their own, without any real coordination with opposition 
political leaders, although Kamil Chadirchi of NDP, Kamil Umar 
Nadhmi of central committee of the communist party and Fu'ad al-
Rikabi of the Ba'th party were given the dates some days in advance.'*° 
Originally the date was decided for July 3,1958 but was somehow 
postponed until the night of July 13-14,1958. 
On evening of July 13, 1958, General Qasim was staying in 
Mansur camp with 19"^  infantry Brigade, Arif was one of the three 
battalion commanders of the 20"^ Brigade, managed to take full control 
of whole brigade and directed it to March on Baghdad. Part of brigade 
moved to occupy strategic points in and around Baghdad, while other 
sections surrounded Nuri al-Sa'id's house and the Royal Palace. Nuri 
managed to escape but few members of the Royal family were shot 
dead.'" On the morning of 14"^  July, Qasim and Arif appeared on 
television and declared that a popular government under a republic 
would be inaugurated and called for the maintenance of law and order 
and unity.... In the interest of the homeland.''^ Martial law was declared 
a few hours later, huge crowd appeared in the streets of Baghdad in 
support of the revolution while the leaders celebrating the downfall of 
the regime. Cabinet was soon announced. It was moderate and 
nationalist government in its complextion. The ICP and the KDP was 
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not invited to participate in the Goverment. The free officers occupied 
the most important post in the government, Qasim and Arif, became the 
PM (and defence) and interior affairs ministers respectively. The main 
aim of the government was to abolish the main institution of the old 
regime and to arrest those officers who were associated with it. 
Relations were established with China, Soviet Union and other socialist 
countries to pursue its foreign policies independent of Britain and the 
West. Iraq no longer attended the meeting of Baghdad Pact and 
subsequently has left the membership of the Pact which was signed in 
1955. 
Qasim's Regime in Iraq 
General Qasim's public appearances were greeted with full 
enthusiasm and enjoyed full support of the public, but beneath the 
surface, conspiracies, tensions and differences were growing between 
Qasim and Arif which soon came on the forefront. Although Qasim and 
Arif have emerged as principally responsible for the coup and change of 
regime, differences between them emerged almost within the few days, 
there was confusion about their respective positions. They soon become 
identified in the public mind as 'Left Wing' and 'Right Wing'."*^ 
In July 1958, the increasing popularity of Nasser and the new 
situation created by the formation of the UAR(United Arab Republic) 
had greatly widened the appeal of Pan Arabism, particularly among the 
Sunni Arab population, at the time when the ICP was widely regarded as 
a, if not the leading political force within Iraq. With the gradual 
entrenchment of Qasim regime and the widespread propaganda to the 
effect that he was simply a tool of the communist, the nationalist 
Nasserist and the Ba'th gradually developed into the main focus of 
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opposition to the communist, in which they were supported by 
materially and morally by Nasser and his supporters in Syria/' ' 
At the end of July 1958, Michel Aflaq, the Secretary General and 
co-founder of Ba'th party, arrived in Baghdad from Damascus to try to 
press the new government to join UAR (United Arab Republic), of 
which he himself had been a prime mover. A few days later after the 
Revolution, Arif who was the deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Interior, paid a visit to Damascus, where he met and appeared in public 
with Nasser and the Syrian president Shukri al-Quwwatli. There were 
constant growing differences between the ideas of Qasim and Arif. 
Qasim realized that he would have to counter Arif by a vigorous 
espousal of the anti unity cause, which for many reasons brought him 
even closer to the communists. On the other hand Arif continued his 
support for Wahda and Uruba therefore, he was dismissed as Deputy 
Commander in Chief of armed forces on September 10, 1958, but he 
continued to raise his voice for unity. He was appointed as ambassador 
in Bonn on October 12, 1958, where he refused to take the charge of the 
the post, but was eventually forced to accept it. He returned secretly to 
Baghdad in November, where he was immediately arrested, tried in 
court, and sentenced to death, but was reprieved in February 1959. 
Arifs fall was important for many reasons. His disappearance from the 
political scene seemed to weaken the position of the nationalist in 
government and marked the beginning of clampdown against them and 
the Ba'thists. After dismissing Arif from the post, Qasim dismissed 
several other prominent Arab nationalist and close friends and relatives 
of Qasim were given higher post in the government. Finally, after Arifs 
removal Qasim had no serious rival and could become sole leader, as he 
was known after October 1958.''^ 
After the fall of Arif, it had become obvious to many of his 
supporters that leadership of nationalist must be given in some strong 
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hands and its leadership might fall upon the veteran politician Rashid 
Ali al Gaylani, who had returned to Baghdad in September at the age of 
66 after seventeen years of exile in Germany, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and 
Syria. 
A revolt against the Qasim regime was taken up in Mosul, in 
1959, but it failed. The failure of Mosul revolt, had led the nationalists 
and the Ba'th to the conclusion that the only way was to assassinate 
Qasim and then to assume power themselves. Qasim, during that time 
was busy in gaining the lost confidence of the moderate forces and thus, 
began to make important concessions towards them. The officers 
dismissed after Mosul revolt, were reinstated into the army at the 
beginning of August ,1959, and Qasim also made conciliatory overtures 
to a number of prominent nationalist. On the other hand, the nationalist 
and the anti-Qasim camp were gaining confidence and also attracted 
public sympathy of the people for their cause during the trial of the 
leaders of the Mosul revolt. Tabaqchali made a speech on behalf of 
himself and his fellow defendants, and many of the accused alleged that 
the statements that they had made before the trial had been entracted 
from them by force or under torture.''^ 
On September 20,1959, Tabaqchali and Rifat al Hajj Sini were 
executed, together with eleven other fellow conspirators and the four 
members of the old regime.'*'' The Ba'thists then felt that the time was 
ripe for their assassination plan, and on 7, 1959, October an attempt on 
Qasim's life was made as he was driving down Rashid street. Altogether 
his driver was killed, but Qasim himself escaped, with extensive 
injuries. The assassins, who included the twenty three years old Saddam 
Hussein, managed to get away into the narrow ways of the main 
thoroughfare and most of the plotters, including the Ba'th secretary 
general Fu'ad al-Rikabi, managed to escape to Syria."*** Qasim once again 
came back to Baghdad and on January 1, 1960, announced that political 
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parties would be legalized and ICP immediately applied for registration. 
At the same time, a similar quest on behalf of an organization calling 
itself as Iraqi communist party, was made by Daud al Sayigh, who had 
been associated with the League of Iraqi communist in the 1940's and 
early 1950.^ "^ 
The communist party which had no organization or members, was 
Qasim's answer to the real ICP and was registered instead of the ICP 
along with the KDP and NDP.^ *^ Qasim's over confidence was expressed 
in a series of erratic and reckless acts that gave birth to serious doubts 
about his intentions. His extra ordinary attempts to annex Kuwait in the 
summer of 1961, presented the atmosphere of almost total 
unreality,during his last phase of regime. Apart from souring relations 
with Kuwait, Qasim managed to unite almost all members of the Arab 
league against Iraq, and damaged his position both at home and abroad, 
by the palpable hollowness of his claims and the absurdity of the manner 
in which he persuaded them.^' In October and November 1961, he 
released all those who had been sentenced by Mahdawi, including Arif 
and Rashid Ali and the rest of those who had been condemned either to 
death or to periods of imprisonment for their involvement in plots 
against the regime. 
The failure of the attempt on Qasim's life in 1959 had damaged 
the Ba'th party organization, and then proved difficult to rebuilt, and by 
April 1960 Ali Salim al Sadi, who had escaped to Syria after the 
attempt, had returned to Iraq on orders of Ba'th National Command^^ to 
re-organise the party with a view to overthrow the regime of Qasim. By 
May 1962, Ali Salim al Sadi had build up effective lines with number of 
groups opposed to the Qasim's regime. But Ba'th membership at this 
stage was still not so huge.'^ The February 1963 coup was an example of 
its kind: detailed planning, close coordination with officers, who were to 
seize key military and communication installations, the killing of the 
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head of the state, the nomination of military figurehead as the new 
president. The actual participants of the coup were a group of Ba'thist 
and nationalist officers, most of whom were prominent Ba'thist & 
Nationalist leaders. The coup was eventually launched on February 
8,1963, a Friday. Qasim ordered to arrest Al Sadi on February 9, 1963, 
when the conspirators began to broadcast over the radio early morning 
of S"' February that there were immediate demonstration in favour of 
Qasim's regime all over the Baghdad, people walked down over streets 
to defend his regime. The months between February and November, 
1963 saw some of the most terrible scenes of violence, which ultimately 
resulted into the victory of Ba'th after the elimination of their rivals and 
execution of Qasim.^'* 
Origin of Ba'th Party 
The Ba'th party was founded in Damascus in 1944 by three 
French advocated Syrian intellectuals, Michael Aflaq, a Greek orthodox 
Christian, Salah al-Din Bilai, a Sunni Muslim and Zalai al-Arsuzi, an 
alawite."^^ The Ba'th was founded at a time when Syria was under French 
mandate, and developed first as national liberation movement in 
opposition to the French and subsequently in response to what its 
founders regarded as the political and ideological inadequacies of the 
older generation of Syrian nationalists who came to power for a short 
period after Syrian independence in 1946. By 1953, Aflaq and Bitar had 
joined hands with Akram Hawrani's Arab Socialist Party.^^ Most 
distinctive features of Ba'thism at this stage was its Pan-Arab ideology 
and its belief that the Arab states were all a part of single. Arab nation, 
as expressed in the slogan 'one Arab nation with an eternal mission.' 
Like other nationalist ideologies, Ba'thism made constant reference to 
an idealised vision of the past. Different factions arosed within Syrian 
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Ba'th, many of which were against Aflaq and Bitar for having accepted 
both the unity scheme and the dissolution of the party. In March 1963, 
one of these fraction's seized power in Syria. There were some further 
intra - Ba'th coup in 1966 and another in 1970, which brought the 
regime of Hafiz al-Asad in power." 
Ba'thism in Iraq: 
The Ba'thist idea was first brought to Iraq by a few Syrian 
techers late in 1949 and by 1951, Fu'ad al Rikabi had taken confidence 
of the fifty people which enabled him to control the organisation. In 
1957, Rikabi took the Ba'th into the opposition National Front, a 
grouping that was consisted of Ba'thist, Communists, the NDP and 
Istiqial party which welcomed and supported the revolution of 1958.^^ 
The main polarization in 1959 was between Qasim and the communist 
on one hand and nationalist, Ba'thist and their supporters on the other 
hand. In November 1959, group of Ba'thist attempted to assassinate 
Qasim but failed, which led to the temporary breakdown of the 
organization. But Ali Salih al Sadi with the help of Afiaq had begun to 
reorganize the party in Iraq. At the same time Ba'th nationalist took 
over in February 1963. The Ba'th found it very difficult to function 
effectively in a relatively limited sphere where a form of electoral 
competition was possible, such as in the elections to the executive 
committees of labour and professional unions. Even after four years of 
prosecution the communist were able to gain a majority in the elections 
to the federation of university students in March 1967.^^ However, it 
was not the Iraq Ba'th party policy to seed power by means of elections 
or through the means of elections or through the appeal of its 
programmes. On the contrary it relied on the use of force and the coup 
d'etat, using its loose organizational structure and its efficiently 
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organized and committed conspirational group to make direct bids for 
60 
power. 
The Ba'th - Nationalist Alliance of 1963 
The political scene between Feburary to November 1963 was very 
confusing as different groups were striving to get power. By June Al-
Sa'di lost the ministry of interior, his faction quarreled with both Nasser 
and Iraqi Nasserists. At the sixth National Congress in Damascus in 
October 1963 he ranged himself against Aflaq and Bitar, who were 
consequently voted out of office by al-Sa'di and his friends. This 
development and al-Sa'di's monopoly over Iraq encouraged his 
opponents within the Iraqi Ba'th to remove him from his office, His 
group succeeded in eliminating the influence of communist,as they were 
becoming more and more rigid. When Wandawi was dismissed from his 
post as commander of National Guard on November 1,1963 this proved 
very disastrous for Sa'di. On ll"* November, Sa'di and his companions 
held an 'Extraordinary Regional Conference' to expel the rightists from 
the party, and they were arrested by armed forces, hustled to Baghdad 
airport at gunpoints, and were sent to Madrid. The National Guards two 
days later took to the street, where it was allowed to rampage for five 
days until it was crushed by units loyal to Arif. Arif with the help of his 
armed forces moved to exercise his own personal control. 
The Coming of Abd Al-Salam Arif into power (1963 - 1966) 
Abd Al Salam Arif and his allies seized power in November 1963 
and since then all hopes of the establishment of any form of democratic 
political life based on representative institutions had been crushed. 
Thereafter a system emerged that had no other source of legitimacy 
except that conferred by military forces and the possession of monopoly 
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of the means of coercion. After November, a more integrated force, the 
Republican Guard was made, based largely on men from 20"^ infantry 
brigade*'^ a unit from within the armed forces. 
Arif who continued as President and Commander-in-Chief of the 
armed forces, then moved to east but the remaining 'right wing' 
Ba'thist, the Vice President Hasan al Takriti, whose support had been 
important in crushing of Al Sadi and Wandami. Tahir Yahya was 
appointed as Prime Minister in 1964, Arif had engineered the 
resignation of Al Baqr and Al Takriti with the help of his associates. 
However, the core of Ar i fs personal support came from his own family 
and relatives, notably from his brother Abd Al Rahman and colonel 
Sa'id of the Republican Guard, which was largely formed from members 
of Al-Jumayla, the tribe from which the Ari fs originally belonged.^^ 
Arifs main concern was to maintain his power and this he did by 
giving key post to his friends and relatives, but this partial distribution 
of post, brought instability. This political instability had created a 
general crisis of business confidence and had encouraged those in a 
position to do so to liquidate their capital assets and transfer them 
abroad.^"* And during the crisis it was essential for the government to 
stop the outtlowof capital and satisfy the aspirants and supporters to 
take active part in the economic matters. 
After eight weeks Arif replaced Tahir Yahya with the commander of the 
air force, Arif Abd Al-Razzaq, a staunch Nasserist as Prime Minister 
and Minister of Defence. Few days later, a summit was going on in 
casabalance, Arif Abd Al-Razzaq tried to seize power himself. But this 
attempt was crushed. This incident marked the end of any significant 
Nasserist influence within the regime, and al-Bazzaz, a moderate 
nationalist was appointed as Prime Minister on 21 September 1965.^^ 
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The Government under Abd AI-Rahman Al-Bazzaz, (September 
1965 to August 1966) 
Abd Al-Rahman Al Bazzaz was a conservative Sunni nationalist 
for whom attachment to Islamic principles in private and public was of 
immense importance. The National Council of the Revolutionary 
Command created in February 1963. A new military organization the 
National Defense Council, maintained the overall control of the military 
over the cabinet and with republican guard, constituted the mainstay of 
the regime.^^ 
In addition,Al Bazzaz also undertook steps to put an end to the 
arrest and imprisonment of the regime's opponents, to permit free 
expression of thoughts and tried to re-establish a parliamentary system.^^ 
Al-Bazzaz stayed in the office for almost a year. His position came to 
standstill by the sudden death of his patron and protector Abd Al-Salam 
Arif. who died in an air crash in April 1966. The death of Abd Al-Salam 
Arif and the succession of his brother made Al-Bazzaz position more 
insignificant. Abd Al-Rahman emerged as the most favourable 
candidate for the vacant post of President and five weeks later Abd Al-
Rahman Arif asked Al-Bazzaz to resign.^^ 
When the Arab-Israel war took place in June 1967, Abd Al 
Rehman Arif had taken over the premiership himself. Since the inter 
factional quarrels had become too acute. After the war, on 19 July,Abd 
Al Rehman Arif once again gave the premiership to Tahir Yahya, who 
immediately embarked upon a more vigrously anti-imperialist line, 
breaking off all diplomatic relations with Britain and the United States 
and took firm steps to launch independent oil policies.'^ Abd Al 
Rehman made an official visit to France in February 1968 and in April, 
France agreed to supply Iraq with 54 mirage aircraft over the period 
1969-73.^' 
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The Coup of 1968 
By 1968, the political scenario in Iraq started to change the 
Ba'thist Military Bureau and Regional Command had begun laying plans 
for the installation of Ba'thist regime once again. As the coup of 1963, 
they once again realized that they needed allies in the officer corps, 
especially if the Republican Guard were to be neutralized. Contracts 
were made with number of senior officers close to the heart of the 
regime, who had become disagreed with the policies ofAbd Al Rehman 
Arif. The three key officers were all trusted by both Abd Al Rehman 
Arif and SlaiBi Abd Al-Bazzaz and Al-Nayif (a cousin of Slaibi) was 
incharge of military intelligence, Ibrahim Abd Al-Rahman Al-Daud 
headed the Republican Guard and Saud Ghaidan commanded the 
Republican Guard's tank regiment. It was for this reason that they 
supported Ba'thists believing that they could provide enough support 
to ensure the docility of the rest of the armed forces when they carried 
out their coup. 
On July 17, 1968, seizing the opportunity of Brigadier Slaibi's 
absence, the three key officers and their Ba'thists allies acted vigorously 
and they seized the broadcasting house, the ministry of defence and the 
headquarters of the Republican Guard. The Prime Minister and much of 
his cabinet members were arrested and President Abd Al Rehman Arif 
was sent out of the country. A new regime was formed with Hasan Al-
Bakr as President and Nayif as Prime Minister, assisted by Al-Daud as 
minister of defence and the Ba'thist Salih Mahdi Ammash as minister 
of interior. In the armed forces, the Ba'thist Hardan al-Takriti was 
appointed as Chief of staff and commander of the air force. In cabinet 
many seats were allotted to Ba'thist, but the majority of seats passed 
into the hands of three non-Ba'thist leaders of the coup, including the 
leader of the Muslim brotherhood and four Kurds, one of them acting for 
Barzani.'^ 
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Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr and the Consolidation of Power (1968-
1979) 
After having disposed of his allies who had helped him to get 
power, Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr, Hardan Al-Takriti and Salih Mahdi 
Ammash tried to enlarge their area of power at the expense of the other. 
Hasan Al-Bakr emerged triumphant, as President of Iraq, Prime 
Minister, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and 
Secretary General of Ba'th Party. He had immense power of patronage 
at his disposal. He was in many ways a typical regimental officer and 
able to use the language of military collegiality to create a certain bond 
with fellow officers. 
In the beginning, of his rule, Al-Bakr tried tooth and nail to 
impose the rule of Ba'th on the country, and tried to crush all 
opposition. In particular, the main aim of the regime was to secure it 
base in armed forces and the security apparatus, by removing, 
transferring or retiring any officer, whose loyalty was suspected and 
replacing those officers with inexperienced Ba'thists.^'' Al-Nayif and 
Al-Daud were castigated for being anti socialist and for favouring the 
abolition of Iraq National Oil Company. A firm commitment to maintain 
the joint Iraqi Egyptian political line on August 12, 1968, was followed 
fifteen days later by the closure of Iraqi offices of the Arab Socialist 
Union, and the dissolution of the preparatory committee engaged in 
overseeing the arrangements for the eventual union between Iraq and 
Egypt.' ' 
By the end of the year 1968, several officers were arrested, 
together with some fourty businessmen, generally Iraqi representatives 
of western firm and a host of ministers and former civil servants, 
including Abd Al-Rahman Al-Bazzaz, Adib Al-Jadir and Khayr Al-Din 
Hasib, because of the opposition to the regime. In November 1968, 
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Nasir Al-Hani, who has served as Foreign Minister under Al-Nayif who 
had been openly critical of the Ba'th was found murdered/^ In the 
meantime, Al-Bakr was trying to make his position more strong by using 
different means and methods. He had build up his own security 
apparatus, headed by his younger relative Saddam Hussein.^^ 
In 1969, a new regional command was announced whose members 
became additional members of the RCC in November 1969. Fifty three 
people were executed, in 1969, for alleged offences against the state. 
Some of the accused were forced to confess their crime on television. 
In January 1970, Iraqi security uncovered a plot to overthrow the 
regime, made by Tehran, which had appeared most serious threat to 
Ba'th since its seizure of power. Forty two people were executed till 
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January 24 for their involvement m the plot. At the same time have 
having manoeuvred themselves into a position where they could take 
greater control of the RCC, Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein were also 
assiduously 'Ba'thing' the armed forces. More than 3,000 new 
commissions were announced by the end of 1970, enabling Al-Bakr and 
Saddam Hussein to install the political commissions at all level, 
individuals who were part of a chain of command effectively bypassed 
the formal military hierarchy and let ultimately to Saddam Hussein.^*^ 
Since 1970, there were so many ups and downs in Iraqi political 
scenario. In May 1971, Saddam Hussein took over the chairmanship of 
the Ba'th Kurdish committee, presumably in attempts to speed matters 
along and perhaps also in view of the evidently impending crisis in 
Iraq's relations with Iran, in which it would be clearly to Baghdad's 
advantage to have Barzani more firmly on its side. However, Barzani 
himself had never convinced by the Ba'th's protestation of good faith, 
and Iran's increasing belligerency and its evident intention to act as the 
United States stalking horse in the Gulf after Britain's withdrawal at the 
end of 1971^' seems eventually to have persuaded him that a close 
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alliance with Teliran would offer him greater security than the vague and 
generally inadequate assurances he had been able to extract from 
Baghdad. At the end of December 1971, it was announced that 
negotiations would soon take place with the IPC in an effort to resolve 
the difference between the company and the government. 
The situation of the Ba'th during the period between the 
nationalization of IPC in June 1972 and the Algiers Agreement in March 
1975 continued to be both precarious and vulnerable. Although the first 
communist minister had been appointed to the cabinet in May 1972^\ it 
was not until July 1973 that the ICP took the collective decision to 
participate in the National Patriotic Front. By mid June 1972, several 
governmental delegations and numerous freelance oil salesmen had 
already arrived in Baghdad to make offers for Iraqi crude , and by the 
end of August major deals had been concluded with energy ministries 
and other state oil organizations in Japan, India, Greece and Brazil.^^ 
Travel and foreign exchange operations were strictly controlled and 
imports for 1972 were slightly down. However, by April 1973 most of 
these measures had been lifted and Saddam Hussein's warning at a 
peasant union rally in June 1972 that Iraq would have to live for two 
years as a non-oil producing country proved initially pessimistic.^^ 
Kazzar, who was appointed to head the security service in 1969, 
by Saddam Hussein, eliminated elements considered dangerous to the 
party when the position of regime was becoming uncertain.^^ But very 
soon differences started coming up between Nazim Kazzar and Saddam 
Hussein who had been able to build up an increasing position within the 
security system, anticipated that Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein were 
unlikely to allow him to remain in almost unchallenged control of such 
an important power base, and would not hesitate to use force to oust 
him. He thought that the only way to secure his position was to launch a 
coup against them.^^ But his plot failed and on July 7, 1973, it was 
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announced that special court had found Kazzar and twenty one other 
guilty and were executed immediately on lO"^  July 1973. Shibli Aysami, 
Assistant Secretary General of the party, declared that the Ba'th party 
will learn a good lesson from this criminal and treacherous plot adding 
without obvious irony that the experience would prompt the party to 
support even more tenaciously to democracy, legality and morality.^^ 
During this period the Soviet Union's attempts were going on to 
mediate both between Ba'th's and Kurds and between Iran and Iraq, who 
were busy in fighting with each other on several matters, but the 
attempts did not succeed.^" But after the Rabat Summit in October 1974 
king Husayn of Jordan managed to arrange the preliminary meetings 
between representatives of Iraq and Iran.^' The outcome of these 
negotiations was the Algiers Agreement, concluded by Saddam Hussein 
and Shah of Iran at the beginning of March, which effectively 
terminated hostilities in Kurdistan and powered a way for swift and 
permanent demarcation of the disputed frontier between Iraq and Iran. 
The main features of the agreement which were incorporated in a treaty 
signed in June 1975 , a settlement of the boundary between the two 
states at the Thalweg line in the Shatt Al-Arab in September 1977, all 
no 
members of the party regional command become members of RCC , 
which mean the party and the state were then virtually indistinguishable. 
Thus the party was no longer silent became simply a further means of 
asserting the authority on the state, or more accurately of Saddam 
Hussein.^'' 
By the beginning of 1978, the break with the communists was 
only a matter of time. In March Tariq Al-Sha'b (newspaper) carried a 
series of articles criticizing the regime's policies on the Kurds and the 
economy, implying that it was moving too close to the West for its own 
interest. In reply, to an article written by Tariq Aziz in May in the ba'th 
newspaper Al-Rasid accused the communist of being excessively 
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subservient to Moscow. ^ Three weeks later, it was announced that 
twelve communist had been executed for allegedly carrying out political 
activity in the army. 
At the end of May 1978 Al-Thawra (News paper) warned 
members of the other political parties that the revolutionary punishment 
of execution would be meted out to those who tried to penetrate the 
armed forces. In July the RCC enacted a decree making non-Ba'thist 
political activity illegal for all former members of the armed forces, 
with the death penalty prescribed for offenders.^^ In summer and autumn 
of 1978, there were further reports of execution of communists and 
widespread arrest of party members.^^ 
The situation in the middle east as a whole was greatly affected by 
Anwar Sadat's (President of Eygpt) decision to go to Jerusalem in 
November 1977. This marked such a major departure from the previous 
houses of inter-Arab politics as to require a fundamental change in the 
ground rules, even those states that had never enjoyed cordial relations 
with each other were obliged to make public solidarity against Anwar 
Sadat. These circumstances also combined to bring about a situation in 
which Saddam Hussein was increasingly exempted to assert his own and 
Iraq's pretensions to fill up the leadership vaccum. People listed Sadat's 
policies to the bitter end and other professions of unrelenting hostility 
were accompanied by the adoption of measures on Iraq's part that 
benefited impeded 'the creation of a viable anti-Sadat front'.^^ This gave 
way to Saddam Hussein to prove himself into a position where he could 
take a leading part in coordinating opposition to Sadat and in the process 
to carve out a major ride for himself in inter-Arab affairs. Saddam 
Hussein invited his Arab allies to meet in Baghdad in November 1978 to 
coordinate the action to be taken in the aftermath of the signing of the 
Camp David Accords on Septemberl7, 1978, between Egypt and 
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Israel. 
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During the period between 1978 and 1979, there was constant rift going 
on between Saddam Hussein and Hasan Al Bakr. Saddam Hussein made 
his position very strong in the party and ultimately tooli over the power 
by removing Hasan Al Bakr from his seat. 
On July 16, 1979, one the eve of eleventh anniversary of the Ba'th 
takeover al-Bakr appeared on television to announce his resignation 
and Saddam Hussein was sworn in immediately as President, a 
transfer of power as it had been long expected.'*"* 
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CHAPTER - 2 
Iraq Under Saddam Hussein 
In the middle of July 1979, when Hasan al-Bakr announced his 
resignation and Saddam Hussein was sworn in as the President of Iraq, 
from then the situation in Iraq has changed completely. Films of the 
unprecedented Party Congress called into session and that summer 
showed Saddam, resplendent in a tailored suit with a Cuban cigar, 
weeping as close associates party members, government officials, and 
military officers were accused of crime against the state - including 
plotting a coup with Syria. Saddam abandoned all pretense of honouring 
Ba'thist theory Pan. Arab sympathies, on the new and noble Iraqi 
personae he had created. Instead, Saddam has begun a series of efforts 
intended to keep him in power.' Saddam Hussein's assumption of the 
presidency was in some ways a formality, but it was symbolically 
charged and the speed of the operation showed that Saddam Hussein 
would take no chance in allowing opposition to his personal rule to 
crystallize in Iraq. He acted swiftly and ruthlessly to eliminate all those 
who would not give him unquestioning obedience. In late July 1979 
Saddam Hussein declared that the security forces has uncovered a plot -
masterminded by Syria - aimed at overthrowing the new regime in Iraq 
through the agency members of RCC. Over sixty leading members of the 
regime were arrested. They were tried by special court presided over by 
Saddam Hussein's protege Naime Haddad and many were sentenced to 
death.' Senior members of the party have been executed, while others 
were purged or demoted. They had been associated with the left of the 
party or had shown themselves to be over-enthusiastic about the 
prospects of Union with Syria.^ 
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The obedience to the will of Saddam Hussein and bowing before 
him were now the only criteria for survival. The rise of Saddam 
Hussein, by its native and its consequences, reinforced the long-apparent 
ambivalence of the Iraqi state. On the one hand, an elaborate and 
complex bureaucracy had developed affecting the lives of Iraqi people 
in all spheres. Formal procedures were made for the system - a system 
which placed great stress on conformity, on strict spheres of 
responsibility and on meticulous attention to the details of form and 
discipline. As an engine of power accumulating resources, deploying 
patronage and maintaining control over its inhabitants, it was centered 
on the restrictive circles of Saddam Hussein associates, linked to him 
either through bond of kinship and regional background or through a 
history of personal trust. These men formed the inner circle of Iraqi 
regime, but still were put to test on several occasions, but they always 
supported Saddam Hussein. The Ba'th party was a country wide 
organization, reaching down to the smallest village and most modest 
neighbourhood in an unprecedented way. In addition, the popular Army 
and the youth organization brought even larger members into the para 
military formations established by the regime. 
Saddam Hussein established a National Assembly in March 
1980.''The Assembly was a symbolic Fa9ade - it was powerless and its 
members were vetted by the security services. However, it was meant to 
create an impression of popular supervision of government, to provide 
another symbol of national unity and to give Saddam Hussein another 
forum for presenting himself as the national leader.^ 
In constructing the core of their power in the state, Saddam 
Hussein and his associates looked first to the values and personnel of the 
their own communities. Their patronage was not confirmed to the clans 
of the Sunni-Arab North-West of Iraq, although the commanding 
position in the regime and the security services without exception went 
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to men from such backgrounds. In areas such as the Officers corps, 
where Sunni Arab preponderance was an outcome of its history and that 
of state itself, it would have been perverse and dangerous to have 
forwarded other groups at their expense.^ 
IRAN - IRAQ WAR (1980 - 1988) 
The Iranian Revolution is supposed as the starting point for Iraqi 
decision for going to war with Iran in 1980. The Shah's Iran and 
Ba'thist Iraq were on particularly good terms. There were border crises 
between the countries that raised the prospects of war twice in 1969 and 
1975. The 1975 crisis led to the Algiers Agreement, signed by the then 
Vice President Saddam Hussein and the Shah at on OPEC meeting in the 
Algeria Capital. Iraq agreed to accept the Iranian definition of their 
common border along the Shatt al Arab River. The weakness of Iran in 
conventional power terms, which began in 1977 as the revolutionary 
movement gathered steam, did not immediately excited Iraqi ambition. 
On the contrary, Baghdad expelled Ayatollah Khomeini from Iraq in 
October 1978 and engaged in security consultations with the Shah's 
government. When the monarchial regime fell in February 1979 in Iran, 
it was mildly welcomed by Iraq.^ In June 1979, Ayatollah Muhammad 
Baqi al- Sadr, the most politicized of the major Iraqi Shi'a religious 
leader arrested on the eve of a scheduled trip to Tehran. Violent 
demonstrations occured in Iraqi Shi'a dominated areas. Several 
prominent Iranians including Ayatollah Khomeini condemned the Iraqi 
regime as 'despotic' and 'criminal'. In July 1979 Masud and Idris 
Barzani, the son of Iraqi Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani crossed the 
border into Iran and received support from the government.^ In July 
1979, when Saddam Hussein became the President, things changed to a 
great extent. The two governments sought in the short term to minimize 
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tensions. Border skirmished subsided. This did not however, lead to any 
lessoning of political ferment among Iraq's Shi'a majority. In July 1979, 
while under house, arrest, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqi al-Sadr called for 
violent opposition to the regime. Thereafter the major Iraqi Shi'i 
political group announced the formation of the 'Islamic Liberation 
Movement', prepared to resort to all means to bring down the Ba'thist 
regime in Iraq.^ In October 1979, the organization of the Iraqi Ulema, 
which had been considering of overt political opposition declared its 
support for the use of violence against the government. Al Da'wa the 
major Iraqi Shi'a party formed a military wing by the end of 1979.'° 
In the midst of the rising of Shi'a opposition in late 1979, Iranian 
politics took a militant turn. Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan resigned in 
November 1979, in the wake of the take over of the American embassy 
in Tehran. Statements about the need to export the Iranian revolutionary 
model around the region became more frequent. By 1980 there were 
explicit calls by Iranian government officials for the Iraqi people to 
overthrow the Ba'th regime." 
On April 1,1980, a member of one of the Shi'a opposition groups 
attempted to kill Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz. During the funeral 
procession some people were killed in that attempt, when a bomb was 
thrown from a window of an Iranian school in Baghdad as the 
procession went past. In retaliation the Iraqi government executed 
Ayatollah Muhammad Baqi al-Sadr and his sister and began to expel 
tens of thousands of Iraqi Shi'a of Iranian origin from the country. 
These events added fuel to the decision of war with Iran. With the 
changes in Iran after November 1979 and the more open calls for the 
export of the Islamic revolution, domestic unrest in Iraq came to be seen 
as desired by Tehran. Realizing the situation, Saddam Hussein decided 
to choose the risky path of war.'^ 
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In the early part of 1980 a few border clashes took place between 
the two countries. At the same time, the outlines of an unparalleled 
opportunity began to appear before Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi 
leadership. Revolutionary Iran was volatile and aggressive but it also 
seemed weak. Furthermore, the mistrust between the Iraqi regime and 
Iran's armed forces had led to purges of thousand of officers and led to 
administrative chaos in the military establishments. Saddam Hussein, by 
contrast was confident of his own and his state's strength relative power. 
He destroyed his most intimate opponents to gain undisputed mastery of 
the Iraqi state, safe for the movement from the factional infighting 
which had undermined previous Iraqi leaders. In a dramatic gesture 
Saddam Hussein publicity abolished the 1975 Treaty and asserted Iraqi 
sovereignty over the whole of Shatt al Arab before the meeting of the 
National Assembly on September 17, 1980.'^ 
The Course of the War 
The full fledged war between Iran and Iraq started on September 
21-22, 1980 when Iraq launched a broad - front offensive across the 
Shatt Al-Arab at several points. 
(1) In the north between Qasre-e-shiri and Naft-e-Shah, with division 
strength of 10,000 men. 
(2) The further south at Mehran with strength of 3,000 men 
(3) Toward Dezful 
(4) Around the oil ports of Khoramshahr and Abadan in the Persian 
Gulf."' 
It was a full scale war in terms of nature of modern warfare as it 
covered the area of confrontation between the two countries. Yet Iraq 
did not deploy the large forces as required. This was perhaps due to the 
fact that Iraq had not discounted the possibility of retreating in the 
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wake of either super powers oppositions to the Iraqi aggression leading 
them to military intervention or an Israel attack in the west or Syria, 
long time Ba'thist enemies joining the war from Iranian side.'^ 
Iran retaliated the attack by carrying out raids into territories. Iran 
started the war with large ground force comprised of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards, the Mustazfeen, regular army personal and the 
border tribal military equipped with light medium weapons and small 
artillery. Iran made low level interdiction raids on major Iraqi cities viz. 
Baghdad, Mosul and Kirkuk, Iran used its force to bomb the invading 
armies of Iraq and to destroy the vital economic installation of Iraq as 
well as block the supply line to Iraqi armed forces fighting in Iran.'^ 
The war reverted to the state of Stalemate after a few days of the 
war started. The Iraqi strategy was to launch a broad front offensive, 
which did not pay off due to the failure to commit a sufficiently large 
army on the war front. The Iraqi army failed to occupy strategic 
positions, including cities of Dezful, Ahwaz and Khoramshahr in Iran.'^ 
Despite succeeding off and on in overcoming Iranian resistance, the 
Iraqi army showed self restraint in advancing further and preferred to 
confine themselves to border areas only.'^ 
This proved that Iraq aimed at achieving limited victory only 
instead of over running the whole of Iran. Iraq's limited objectives were 
to create internal chaos in Iran, cause the collapse of Islamic 
government, occupy the Arab dominated Khuzestan Province of Iran and 
establish control over the river Shatt-al-Arab. After some time Iran 
again plunged back to war. It re-captured the lost territories to Iraq and 
forced the Iraqi armed forces to retreat, which was the first Iraqi 
reversal in the war.'** Long and frequent halts in Iraqi attack during the 
1981 summer gave Iran required time to reorganize its armed forces and 
increase their numerical strength to outnumber the invading army. Since 
Iran had failed to deploy a large army in the first year of war, which was 
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being re-constituted, it suffered a great loss of lives at the hands of Iraqi 
forces.^° In December 1981, Iranian army succeeded in capturing key 
crossroads linking Iraq's entire southern borders. Finally, the 
revolutionary guards, largely teen aged boys called "human waves" 
managed to cross the international borders in June 1982. The decision of 
Iran to war with Iraq was mainly for two reasons, firstly, to overthrow 
the regime of Saddam Hussein and secondly, abetting Shia resurgence in 
Iraq. Till 1984, Iran continued launching several "human waves" 
offensive in Iraq. However, the Iranian army failed in breaking into 
Iraqi defenses. It made an abortive attempt to seize the port of Basra 
town from rest of the Iraq.^' However, the Human Waves assaults did 
not leave Iraq without the fear of loosing a considerable portion of 
border areas to the Iranian army. Thus, Iraq offered unilateral cease fire 
that Tehran rejected. The Iranian army over-enthusiastic, made a number 
of miscalculated attempts. Iraq put up a stiff resistance owing to its 
superiority in weapons system. When in March 1984, the Iranian troops 
made through the Marrhland in a planned quick push through a gap in 
the Iraqi third and fourth armies, the swampy battlefield deterred their 
progress and made hundreds of them sitting ducks to Iraqi fighters. 
The war of economic attrition was started by Iran instead of Iraq. 
This phase began with Iraqi attack on Kharg Oil Terminal in spring of 
1984. However, Iran had launched the war of economic attrition as the 
war broke out. Even in 1983 it restored to it by launching Va-Fajr-4 air 
attack around Kurdish mountain near the Iraqi tower of Punjwan on 
October 20, 1984. The main Iranian objectives underlying this attack 
were to damage the Iraq-Turkey-Mediterranean pipeline through which 
much of Iraq's export bound oil passed and to render its Kurdish oil 
fields ineffective.^'' 
In retaliation, Iraq bombed the Iranian town of Dezful, Marzed, 
Sulaiman and Behbehan and inflicted huge damage to latter's life and 
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economy. The attack turned the war from ground to air war. However, 
Iran like Iraq, did not switch over to air warfare. The Iraqi strategy was 
to damage the Iranian oil facilities, which facilitates 90 percent of Iran's 
oil export and earned Iran 80 percent of its revenues. 
The war between the two sides took a new turn with large scale 
sinking of oil tank in the straits of Hormuz from mid April 1984 by Iraq. 
Iran followed the suit. In early months of 1984, Iranian jet attacked as 
many as five oil ships bound for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. A total 
number of 67 tankers/ships got attacked in the year 1984 alone. In 
1985 more Iranian ships and oil installations were targeted. Since Iran 
closed the river Shatt al-Arab to Iraqi ships it reached by launching, 
another ground offensive in March 1985. In February 1986, Iran made 
most successful ground offensive in reply of Iraq's using chemical 
weapons. The Iranian army comprising of 10,000 revolutionary guards 
crossed the Shatt al-Arab, in small boats, into the Fao Penensula which 
97 
was captured within 24 hours. 
The war entered its most crucial phase after Iran's January 6-8 
1987 assault the Karbala 5 offensive on Basra. Also this offensive 
incurred a human toll of 40,000 to Iraq. It was the second major victory 
of Iran after Fao in 1986. The attack on the cities began in 1985 when a 
ground engagement reached a state of stalemate. It was started by Iran 
with artillery attacks on southern Iraqi cities of Basra, Baghdad, Kirkuk, 
Mandali and Khanaqur. In response, the Iraqi air forces bombed the 
partially constructed nuclear plant at Bushehr and at a steel plant in 
Ahwaz beside heavily damaging Tehran and 40 other Iranian cities. The 
air superiority and the possession of chemical weapons facilitated 
Iraqi's regular raids on Iranian cities. Iran's strategy in the war of cities 
was to offset the cumulative cost of the Human Waves offensive.^^ 
In early 1988 the war of cities re-erupted. This time it was started 
by Iraq, it took advantage of the low morale of Iran. Iranian ground 
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forces, despite trying seizes around Basra for the last years or so failed 
to conquer the city. Domestic or internal discontentment against an 
unfruitful war had begun appearing in Iran. The moderate elements in 
Iran policies were worrying of carrying on an endless game of war and 
losses. Iran's military power was continuously depleting to continue the 
war against Iraq. Although the Iraqi armed forces were able to regain 
their lost territories compared to Iran, Iran in this war lost to a great 
extent. Ayatollah Khomeini had to undergo the trauma of accepting the 
proposal, which he had earlier rejected as discriminatory and resolved 
general perceptions of the reasons behind Iran's defeat to Iraq was the 
yawning gap in the military capabilities of the two countries is described 
as one of such reasons. Iraq's victory in this war was not without a 
cost, the Iraqi's suffered an estimated 375,000 causalities, another 
60,000 were taken as prisoners by the Iranians. The Iran - Iraq war 
lasted nearly eight years, from September of 1980 until August of 1988. 
It ended when Iran accepted United Nations (UN) Security Council 
Resolution 598, leading to a 20 August, 1988 cease fire.^" 
Role of UN in Iran-Iraq War 
The Iran-Iraq war in its eight year course, showed an almost 
insurmountable challenges to the United Nations conflict resolution 
capability. Since the outbreak of war between the two countries, the 
peace initiatives were started by United Nations. In September 28, 1980, 
the Security Council passed its first resolution 514 and then several 
other resolutions to solve the conflict were passed by United Nations. In 
1985, Secretary General Perez de Cuellar became more directly involved 
and the resolution 582 was passed in 1986, which deplored the initial 
attack and as well as called upon both the countries to ceasefire on July 
20, 1987. 
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On September 28 and 26 1980, Security Council met at the 
request of Mexico and Norway and adopted a resolution 470, calling on 
Iraq and Iran to cease hostilities urging them to accept mediation or 
conciliation. The Security Council also called upon all states to exercise 
restraints and to refrain from any act that might further lead to 
escalation and widening of war. Later, United Nations deputed its 
special representative OLF Palme to mediate between Iran and Iraq to 
end the war.'^' 
The efforts of United Nations, till that time failed to bring 
complete peace between the two countries, the resolution only called for 
ceasefire but not for withdrawal of forces. Looking to the complicated 
situation Security Council held another meeting to resolve the dispute 
by adopting resolution 479, which represented the Council's immediate 
concern for putting a halt to and preventing further escalation of the 
conflict, and requested the parties to strike for the resolution of the 
differences by peaceful means. The question of blame worthiness for the 
initiation of the conflict was not addressed by the resolution. On 
October 1, 1980 the President of Islamic Republic of Iran Bani Sadr 
stated in a message to the Secretary in violation of Iran's territorial 
sovereignty, there is no use for any discussion, directly or indirectly, 
regarding the conflict between the two countries.^^ 
Again on May, 1982, the Secretary General sent identical message 
to the President of Iran and Iraq to adopt the resolution 514 at the floor 
of United Nations meeting. The resolution of 514 (1982) called for a 
ceasefire and for an immediate end of all military operations involved in 
the conflict. 
On July 13, 1982 Iraq declared that it was ready to cooperate in 
the implementation of the resolution. The Secretary General on July 15, 
1982 responded to the Secretary Council's request by his report on 
arrangements required to send United Nations observers to supervise the 
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ceasefire and troops withdrawal.'^'' Moreover, the stalemate-mnJK 
peacekeeping initiative was matched equally by a lack of progress on the 
strategic front by both sides. By 1983, logistic weakness of Iranian side 
and operational weakness of the Iraq led to strategic stalemate with both 
sides confronting each other along a front roughly congruent with the 
pre-war border.^^ By mid 1983, the Secretary General sent a mission to 
visit civilian areas in Iran and Iraq which had been subject to military 
attack.^^ The Security Council on October, 31, 1983 adopted a 
resolution, requesting the Secretary General to continue his mediatory 
efforts. On November 1, 1983 Iraq accepted the resolution that it 
regarded it as an integrated and indivisible whole, and declared its 
readiness to cooperate for its implementation. On November 11, 1983, 
Iran informed the Secretary General that it considered the latest 
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resolution as biased and discriminatory. 
The tanker war between Iran and Iraq led the Security Council, on 
June 1, 1984 to adopt resolution 552, which called upon all states to 
respect the right of free navigation and condemn recent attacks on 
commercial ships enroute to and from the port of Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia. The Security Council further demanded that there would be no 
attacks on ships that are enroute to and from states that are not party to 
the conflict.^^ However, despite resolution 553 (1984) which called upon 
both the states to stop tanker war, the air war over the Persian Gulf 
continued undeterred. On June 29, 1984 Secretary General gave 
message to Iran and Iraq, in which he indicated that chemical weapons 
might not be used again, he called upon both the government to make a 
solemn commitment not to use chemical weapons of any kind for any 
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reason. 
On July 2, 1984, Iran welcomed the appeal by Secretary General, 
but Iraq remained skeptical to the request made by Secretary General. A 
new situation arose when, in October 1984, Iraq alleged that Iran had 
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fired on and killed a number of Iraqi prisoners of war at camp at 
Gorgon. Iran. Iraq again requested the Secretary General to look, into the 
matter. The mission visited the area from January 11 to 25, 1985 and 
reported to the Secretary General that neither country were the prisoners 
of war treated as badly as alleged by the opposing government. In March 
1985, war emerged again between Iran and Iraq. On March 17, 1985 
Secretary General presented proposals (eight point peace plan to both 
the countries for reducing the level of conflict). On February 24, 1986 
the Security Council passed the resolution 582, which reflected a 
grouping initiative on its parts to adopt a conciliatory attitude towards 
Iranian offensive into Iraqi territory. The Security Council accepted the 
Iraq's request to strongly condemn for its repeated and large scale use of 
chemical weapons.'*' The Security Council in early 1987 again seized 
Iran-Iraq matters, when alarmed by Iran's latest winter offensive to 
capture Iraqi city of Basra,''^ the Secretary General called the Security 
Council to consider the Gulf war."*^  On January 13, 1987, in a press 
conference at UN headquarters, the Secretary General proposed to 
Security Council to convene an urgent meeting at level of foreign 
ministers to deal with the continuing of war.'*'' 
From 1980 till 1987, the resolutions passed by United Nations did 
not proved to be fruitful and decisive. They displayed their inability and 
ineffectiveness in restoring and maintaining peace. Seeing the situation, 
the UN Security Council adopted resolution 598 on July 20, 1987, to end 
the conflict. It called upon both the states to withdraw all military forces 
to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay. The 
resolution 598 further emphasized on the following other matters:'*^ 
(a) Asked the Secretary General to explore in consultation with Iran 
and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with 
enquiring into responsibility for the conflict. 
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(b) Determined that there exist a breach of peace as regards the 
conflict between Iran and Iraq and the Council was acting under 
Article 39 and 40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
(c) Decided that the Security Council would meet again as necessary 
to consider further steps to ensure compliance with the 
resolution. 
Iraq welcomed this resolution but Iran on the other hand rejected 
the resolution and criticized it. 
Commenting on resolution 598 (1987), the Secretary General 
urged that the resolution was the elimination of the joint efforts by 
Council members to establish the basis for a comprehensive, just and 
honorable settlement between Iran and Iraq.'*^ Meanwhile, on July 18, 
1988, Iran announced its unconditional acceptance of UNSC resolution 
(598) (1987) and thereby the conflict came to and end. 
On August 6, 1988, Iraq declared its readiness to ceasefire on 
condition that if Iran agrees, it is ready to accept and implement 
resolution 598 immediately after ceasefire. Therefore, on August 20, 
1988 a formal ceasefire was secured in eight year long war in the 
context of the full implementation of the Security Council resolution 
598 (1987) under supervision of especially created 350 members 
monitoring force - the UN Iran - Iraq military observer group and peace 
negotiations begin in Geneva on August 25, 1988, at Foreign Ministerial 
level. The entire process has exemplified the efficacy of a mandate 
entrusted to the Secretary General when actively supported by UN 
Security Council and backed by the complementary efforts of the 
member states.''^ 
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The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (1990-91) and Aftermath 
After wining the war against Iran, which Saddam Hussein always 
claimed to have fought on behalf of the 'Arab Nation'. His armed 
forces had increased enormously, from 200,000 to one million men, and 
his sophisticated weaponry in same proportion/^ Saddam Hussein was 
well aware of the fact that ending of the war with Iran, the crushing of 
Kurdish rebellion and the continued effective suppression of Shi'a 
Islamist organization did not remove political challenges to his own 
position. His first target was the officer corps itself. In some respect he 
was helped by the fact that the Iraqi armed forces were so large that the 
officer corps was quite heterogeneous and could not easily act as a 
corporate body, even when some of its members were threatened. Using 
the tested means of patronage and discrimination Saddam Hussein 
favoured and promoted some, while demoting and retiring others. This 
way, he sought to break many of the bonds which had formed during the 
war years and to destroy the institutional memory that could make the 
Iraqi officers corps as a whole so formidable a challenge to his 
leadership.^*' 
In the area of economic field Saddam Hussein was facing a great 
and obvious challenge. The shortage of funds to keep the wheels of 
patronage turning and to maintain the subsidised, import based 
consumption-oriented economy of Iraq was something that could 
potentially create a tide of resentment against a leader who seemed 
incompetent rather than heroic. The very indebtness of Iraq to a wide 
range of creditors placed the country in turmoil. Price control was 
removed, entrepreneurial activity was encouraged and a number of state 
factories were sold off to private individuals. Licenses were granted for 
private industrial projects. These activities did an excellent job in profit 
making. At the same time, they led to massive inflation which became 
so serious that regulation had to be re-imposed in a number of areas.^' It 
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was in these circumstances that Iraq tried to increase its oil revenues by 
seeking to persuade OPEC to raise the price of oil through new 
restrictive quotas. 
In particular, Saddam Hussein looked to Iraq's Gulf neighbours, 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to help and extricate it from its financial 
plight in a number of ways. They were supposed to cooperate in 
maintaining a high price for oil, through restraint of their own 
production and pressure on others. Furthermore, they were asked, by 
Iraq to declare that the $-40 billion amount which they had given to Iraq 
during the war with Iran should be considered a grant and not a loan, but 
this demand of Iraq was intentionaly rejected by them. These answers 
received by Iraq led Saddam Hussein and his associates to use even 
more threatening - and indeed desperate - language in the first six 
months of 1990, hinting that, if these resources were not granted freely, 
Iraq might use other means to extract them. 
The idea for using military power began to take shape during this 
period. Kuwait was to be the immediate target, in the calculation by 
Saddam Hussein, Kuwait was a country which could either retained 
through puppet government or through annexation. Saddam Hussein 
thought that his invasion of Kuwait would alleviate Iraq's financial 
position, and would greatly enhance his authority and would establish 
Iraq both as dominant power in the Gulf and a leader in the oil market.^^ 
In the beginning February 1990, Saddam Hussein launched a 
virulent campaign against the United States and Israel^'* presenting him 
as the only steadfast Arab leader capable of defending the Arab nation 
against the West and its allies in the region. In 1990, it was aimed at 
establishing a controlling influence for Iraq in the affairs of Kuwait and 
at humbling the oil-rich Arab rulers of the Gulf States. Having failed to 
wring substantial concessions out of the Gulf States, despite an 
increasingly menacing tone, and having established to his satisfaction at 
59 
least the probable acquiescence of the Arab States and of the United 
States, Saddam Hussein ordered his forces to invade Kuwait on August 
2, 1990. The occupation was completed within twenty four hours. 
Meanwhile, Iraq established a Kuwaiti provisional government to 
provide the fiction that the Iraqi forces have been invited into the 
country to defend a revolution against the ruling al-Sabah family. 
However, within few days, Iraqi government announced that it would 
return Kuwait to the Iraqi homeland. The annexation was formally 
achieved by the end of August when Kuwait was declared as the 
nineteenth province of Iraq.^^ 
The Role of UN in Gulf Crisis 1990-91 
Within hours of Iraqi invasion, the United Nations Security 
Council convened a meeting to discuss the situation. The UN Security 
Council passed resolution 660 on August 2, 1990, under article 39 and 
40 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which provided that breach of 
peace was committed by Iraq and urged upon it to withdraw immediately 
and unconditionally to the position before the invasion.^^ On August 3, 
Iraq moved troops to the Iraqi-Saudi border. Again UN Security Council 
passed a resolution on August 6, resolution 661, which declared 
comprehensive trade and financial sanctions against Iraq.^^ The 
resolution (661) also constituted a committee of all the members of the 
Council to supervise the progress of the implementation of the 
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sanctions. Iraq, formally annexed Kuwait on August 8, 1990 claiming 
it was a part of Iraq in the past, after the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq, 
the UN Security Council unanimously adopted the resolution 662 on 
August 9, 1990 declaring the annexation and occupation of Kuwait as 
"null and void"^^ and that its claim had no legal validity. Soon after the 
occupation of Kuwait, Iraq held all the foreign nationals residing in Iraq 
and Kuwait into custody and confined them in strategic places to be 
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used as human shields of which the UN Security Council took serious 
note of it culminating in the resolution 664 on August 18, 1990. The 
resolution warned Iraq and demanded that Iraq should release all the 
foreign nationals under its custody in Iraq and occupied Kuwait.^" 
Although Iraq was willing to accept the resolution on some conditions, 
but United States and its allies were not ready to accept the conditions 
laid by Iraq and situation remained to be volatile. 
Considering the seriousness of the situation, on August 25, 1990, 
the UN Security Council passed another resolution 665 in 13-0 with 
Cuba and Yemen abstaining. The resolution was related to measures to 
ensure implementations of resolutions 661. The resolution authorized 
the UN Security Council to take "measures as may be necessary 
including use of force to enforce that trade embargo against Iraq by 
member states".^' Iraq once again did not agree to permit food shipment 
to go directly to foreign nationals trapped in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. 
The situation led the UN Security Council to adopt another resolution 
666 on September 13, 1990. The resolution tried to solve the intricate 
question of supply of food and medical aid to Iraq occupied Kuwait on 
humanitarian ground. 
On September 14, 1990, the detention of French ambassador and 
military attack in their residence in Kuwait by Iraqi forces prompted the 
UN Security Council to pass the resolution 667. It condemned Iraq for 
violation of Vienna Convention of April 18, 1961 on diplomatic 
relations and of April 24, 1963 on counsellor relations to both of which 
Iraq is a signatory.^^ 
On September 20, 1990, Iraq warned that it would launch an all 
out war against US led coalition forces if it were convinced that the UN 
trade embargo was about to strangle the Iraqi people. Seeing the 
situation, the Security Council adopted another resolution (669) on 
September 24, 1990, defining the role of sanction committee. The 
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resolution incorporated that the sanction committed is empowered to 
permit food, medical items and other humanitarian aid to be sent to Iraq 
and Kuwait.^'* Despite all these attempts by UN, Saddam Hussein 
continuously emphasized that Kuwait was part of Iraq. Thereafter, the 
UN Security Council adopted resolution (670), which confirmed that 
sanction would apply to all means of transport, including all air cargo 
traffic, except UN authorized humanitarian aid against Iraq and 
occupied Kuwait. The resolution (674) that was passed on October 29. 
1990 by the UN Security Council held Iraq liable for the war damages 
relating to invasion of Kuwait, including human right violation. It 
demanded that all western embassies be restocked with food, water and 
protection of Kuwaitis and foreign nationals in Iraq and Kuwait and it 
further demanded an immediate release of all hostages.^^ Thus the 
resolution paved the way for future claims of restitution or financial 
compensation from Iraq.^^ Again on November 28, 1990 the UN 
Security Council vide resolution (677) condemned the Iraqi attempts to 
alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and the 
destruction of civil records. It also directed the Secretary General to 
take possession of Kuwait census and citizenship records for safe 
keeping.^^ When these resolutions failed again and again, the UN 
Security Council came out with resolution 678 on November 29, 1990 
authorizing the "use of force" to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait. The 
resolution states that acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of United 
nations, one demand that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) 
and all subsequent relevant resolutions and decides, while maintaining 
all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of 
goodwill, to do so, thus authorizes members states to cooperate with the 
government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before January 15, 1991, fully 
implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolution, 
"to use all necessary means" to uphold and implement, the UN Security 
62 
Council resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolution and 
to restore international peace and security in the area, third request, all 
states to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in 
pursuance of paragraph 2 of 678 (1990) resolution.^^ 
The resolution kept the military option open after January 15, 
1991 against Iraq. The previous UN Security Council Resolutions have 
been the leading factors for passing the resolution 678 (1990). President 
Bush and President Gorbachev had already announced that if the current 
steps failed to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, they are prepared to 
consider additional ones consistent with the UN charter.^^ 
The wording of the resolution 678 were not clear as to whether 
the action against Iraq is to be taken under chapter VII of the UN or 
resort to military action under article 46 and 47 by creating a military 
staff committee. Iraq immediately reacted to both the resolution 678 
(1990) and deadline of January 15, 1991 and denounced "it as illegal 
and invalid." The Iraqi newspaper Al-Thawra mentioned that the 
resolution is a blunt violation of all humanity, peace and legality and 
accused the UN Security Council members of having succumbed to 
pressures, threat and monetary aid to the tune of million of dollars to 
comply with it.'" 
There were some controversial issues regarding the legality of 
resolution (678). The preamble of the resolution started that this 
decision of the UN Security Council was taken under chapter VII of the 
Charter, but the chapter VII include besides the provision of collective 
measures by the UN (article 41 to 42), provision on self-defense 
(Article-51). But the use of armed forces against Iraq was called as 
enforcement action and not collective self defense. The UN Secretary 
General lengthy conversation with Saddam Hussein on January 13, 1991 
gives enough indication that the latter was willing to consider a 
'package deal' if more time was given and diplomatic talks allowed to 
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continue to seek a solution through means other than war.^' However, 
the US and its allies preferred to seek a military action against Iraq after 
all the attempts at peaceful solution were exhausted. 
Iraqi refusal to compromise with the UN Security Council 
resolution by January 15, 1991, led the US and its allied countries 
promptly availing the authority of the UN Security Council on the basis 
of resolution 678 to attack on Iraq on January 16, 1991 to evict Iraq 
from Kuwait. Thereafter, the biggest and most powerful military action 
was taken on January 17, 1991 against Iraq by US led coalition forces. 
The Gulf war was coded as "operation Desert Storm."^^ But the Gulf war 
was not the UN war against Iraq, it was clear from the war led by US 
that the UN Security Council had a very little control over the military 
action taken against Iraq by US. During the war, the US president 
George H. Bush said that the objectives of was very clear. He further 
stated that we want Iraq's troops to leave Kuwait and a legitimate 
government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place and Kuwait 
will be independent and free. As the war progressed and continued, it 
was clear that UN has no control over it, not over the military actions 
against Iraq. 
The UN Security Council meeting was held on February 14, 1991, 
in response to the request made by the number of countries.^'* The 
meeting was held to suggest measures to resolve the conflict. Then, 
another close door meeting of the UN Security Council was held in the 
last week of February, 1991. In this meeting Soviet Union tried to play 
as a mediator and proposed to stop ground offensives.^^ But US rejected 
the peace plan by Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's desire to play a 
mediatory role was frustrated by the swiftness with which the US led 
coalition force could achieve military dominance over Iraq. This was the 
background of the adoption of resolution 686 by the UN Security 
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Council on March 2, 1991, setting the terms for ceasefire. Cuba voted 
against the resolution while China, Yemen and India abstained.^^ 
On March 3, 1991, Iraq agreed to fulfill its obligation under the 
terms of resolution 686 by sending a formal letter to President of 
Security Council and the Secretary General of United Nations.^^ The 
UN Security Council adopted another resolution 687 on April 3, 1991, 
which declared a formal ceasefire of the Gulf war. It set very harsh 
conditions on Iraq. According to this resolution, Iraq was required to 
destroy its chemical, biological and ballistic weapons, surrender its 
nuclear arms facilities, if any, pay compensation for war damages and 
accept its current border with Kuwait.''^ On April 9, 1991, the UN 
Security Council adopted another resolution 689 regarding the 
management of the existing situation after the adoption of formal 
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ceasefire. The Security Council approved the report, of the Secretary 
General to set up United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 
(UNIKOM). This mission became fully operational by May 6, 1991 and 
demilitarized zone came into effect on May 9, 1991.^° Moreover, the UN 
Security Council adopted a couple of resolutions (699) and (700) on 
June 17, 1991. The resolution 699 was the 'cost of destroying Iraqi 
weapons.' According to this resolution, Iraq was held liable for the full 
cost of carrying out the destruction of its weapons as outlined in the 
resolution 687 of the UN Security Council. 
The resolution 700 of the UN Security Council, which related to 
the guidelines for enforcing arms embargo against Iraq, approved a set 
of guidelines to facilitate full implementation of embargo provisions of 
resolution 687. The UN Security Council, on August 15, 1991, adopted 
the resolution 706, which authorized Iraq to sell up to $1.6 billion worth 
of oil. The resolution allowed Iraq to import food and other 
humanitarian supplies, pay for war reparation and cost of destroying its 
own weapons and meet other obligations arising out of its invasion of 
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Kuwait. Both the sale of oil and distribution of supplies were made to 
the subject to UN Scrutiny. Meanwhile, the resolution had been subject 
to Iraq's sharp and immediate reaction and criticism. The Ambassador 
of Iraq to UN, Abdul Amir al-Ansari stated that the resolution was not 
humanitarian but rather a continuation of war against Iraq and also 
continuation of sanctions against Iraq. The UN sanctions in the post 
war period, and the imposition of harsh and drastic conditions on Iraq 
were punitive in nature against its compliance with the conditions of 
ceasefire. 
Iraqi Politics Since 1990-2000 
By mid August 1991, despite the failure of his Kuwaiti invasion 
and the outbreak of internal revolts and, the overthrow of President 
Saddam Hussein, which had been widely predicted during the crisis in 
the Gulf, seemed unlikely in the short term. Indeed, it was argued that 
his position was more secure than it had been at the time of the invasion 
of Kuwait. Opponents of the government in the south of the country had 
been ruthlessly suppressed; a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish 
question was under discussion and in the wake of several alleged 
attempts to mount a military coup deta't the government appeared to 
have strengthened its control of the army which remained the key to its 
survival in power. A reshuffle of the Council of Ministers in March 
1991 had placed the President's close supporters and the members of his 
family in the most important positions of government and additional 
government adjustments later m the year. 
In May 1991, the first UNSCOM (United Nations Special 
Commission on Disarmament) team began their work in Iraq.^^ The 
UNSCOM teams were permitted to visit a number of sites and a 
disturbing picture of Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 
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programs emerged. This process took many years of efforts and 
persistence on the part of UNSCOM, matched by the denial, deception 
and obstruction of the Iraqi authorities. The investigations revealed the 
scale and sophistication of Iraq's various weapons programs, proving 
that Iraq not only had an arsenal of chemical weapons and had 
succeeded in adopting biological organism, such as anthrax and also it 
was on the verge of developing its own nuclear device. A suspicion of 
Iraq's continuing possession of chemical and biological weapons, 
combined with knowledge of the regime's ruthlessness and past use of 
such weapons, would be deterrent enough and not something that 
Saddam Hussein would easily yield.^^ On August 26, 1992, the 
government of US, UK, France and Russia announced their decision to 
establish a zone in southern Iraq, south of latitude 32°N, from which all 
flights by Iraqi fixed wing and rotary-wing aircraft were to be 
excluded.^^ In late December 1992, a US combat aircraft shutdown an 
Iraqi fighter aircraft which had allegedly enters the southern air 
exclusion zone; and on January 6, 1993, US with the support of British 
and French governments, demanded that Iraq should withdraw anti air 
craft missile batteries from within the zone. Iraq was reported to have 
compiled with this demand, but subsequent Iraqi military operations 
inside Kuwaiti territory was to recover military equipments proved air 
attacks by Western forces on target in southern Iraq on January 
13,1993. In late June, the US landed an attack against intelligence 
headquarters in Baghdad, in retaliation for Iraq's role in an alleged 
conspiracy to assassinate former US President George Bush in Kuwait in 
April 1993. In November 1994 Iraq recognized Kuwait as an 
independent sovereign state, thereby formally abandoning its earlier 
claims to sovereignty and recognizing the Iraq-Kuwait border which had 
been finally demarcated by the UN in Kuwait's favour in May 1993.^^ 
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After the Gulf Crisis (1990-1991) was over, the regime itself has 
not been without problems. Coup attempts and attempts on the lives of 
key figures have been regularly reported, in January, February and June 
1992, in September and November 1993, in March, May and June 1995 
and June and December 1996. Some of the plots involved senior 
members of Republican Guard Units composed principally of members 
of Dulaym, Jubbur and Ubayd tribes and terrible vengeance was 
apparently taken on these Units in the spring and summer of 1995.^^ 
There were so many defections and most spectacular of these was the 
departure of two daughters of Saddam Hussein to Jordon in 1995. When 
the two son-in-laws returned to Iraq with their families in February 
1996, they and several other members of their family were shot dead the 
next day in an almost ritualistic manner on the orders of their father in 
law."" 
In August 1997, Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister Taha 
Yasin Ramadhan, replaced Izzat Ibrahim (who was reported to be 
suffering from ill health) as Vice President of the RCC. Towards the end 
of 1997 reports began to emerge of renewed efforts by Saddam Hussein 
to impose his authority on the nation. A number of senior military 
officers and the Ba'th party members were suspected and executed of 
belonging to opposition organization. Iraqi opposition groups however 
remained weak and divided. One of the founding member of INA, Gen. 
Tawfiq al-Yasiri resigned in February 1998, accusing the organization 
leadership of misappropriating funds.^' In February 1999 AyatoUah al 
Sadr was assassinated in the holy city of Najaf, the third Shia cleric to 
be murdered in less than a year. The Iraqi government was blamed for 
the assassination, but it denied in any involvement in the assassination 
and swiftly suppressed the widespread riots among Shia community 
throughout the Southern Province. After going to the brink of military 
action several times during 1997 and 1998, the US, assisted by the 
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British forces launched a four day aerial bombardment on Iraq, named as 
''Operation Desert Fox'' in December 1998. The target was primarily 
military ones, including those sites which the US suspected played a 
role in the concealment of Iraq's weapons programs.^^ However, 
situation of unrest and suspicion continued in the regime. Saddam 
Hussein tried to curb all sort of criticism and opposition with an iron 
hand and situation in Iraq took another turn after George W. Bush came 
to power in January 2001 as President of US. In the meantime reaction 
and response of Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 attacks resulted in bitter 
relationship between Iraq and US, since 2001. 
US Containment Towards Iraq 
Since the end of Cold War and the Gulf War, one of the main 
objectives of American Foreign Policy has been containment of "rogue 
states". President Clinton has described the "rogue States" as the major 
challenge to the Cold War order that poses a serious danger to regional 
stability in many corners of the globe.^'^ Therefore, he advocated the 
doctrine of 'dual containment towards Iraq and Iran because they were 
included in the list of 'backlash' states". The "backlash states" consists 
of Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iran and Iraq. President Clinton's National 
Security Advisor Anthony Lake, blamed these regimes, their 
authoritarian ruling cliques, their aggressive and defiant behaviour, their 
chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world; and 
their pursuit to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD) made clear 
"their commitment to remain on wrong side of history."^^ Thus, it was 
an effort of Clinton's administration to articulate a containment doctrine 
to deal with the challenges posed by "rogue states".^^ 
In case of Iraq, though not directly the US objective was a change 
of regime, but Washington sought full compliance of UN Security 
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Council resolutions. This constituted an implicit policy of rollback. The 
United States pursued this policy multilaterally with its allied in the case 
of Iraq. The US sought the support of its allies in imposing economic 
sanctions and multilateral sanctions against Iraq. In case of Iraq, the US 
goal was to seek Baghdad's compliance with Security Council 
resolutions and to topple Saddam Hussein from his seat of power. 
The Clinton's administration, during 1995-96, struggled to 
maintain its allies support for comprehensive containment and isolation 
of Iraq through multilateral sanctions. Unlike Iran, although, no one has 
advocated an engagement policy with Iraq, concerns were raised about 
the dire impact of sanctions on the Iraqi people and the unexpected 
political durability of Saddam Hussein. Therefore, these concerns, in 
turn raised questions about the efficacy and effectiveness of the 
American strategy. Some US officials referred to this policy as the "end 
game".^^ 
By the year 1997, during the initial days of Clinton 
administration's second term, it was observed that the US policy 
towards the states of Persian Gulf was at an impasse and stalemate. 
Maintenance of the policy and dual containment concerning Iran and 
Iraq has produced uneven results, not all of them positive from the point 
of view of either the US or those of its allies and friends among the Gulf 
States.^^ Thus, the outcome of US containment policy towards Iran and 
Iraq had been mixed. The US had been able to keep President Saddam 
Hussein contained, but failed to topple his regime in Baghdad. In late 
2000, Clinton administration changed the nomenclature from "rogue 
states" to "states of concern" reflecting a softening of attitude in order 
to diplomatically deal with some of these states.'^'^ 
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Economic Sanctions on Iraq after the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) 
The ability of Saddam Hussein to maintain his regime and much 
of his ruling circle intact during the year that followed the defeat of 
1991 was a testimony to the resilence of the system he had constructed. 
To some extent, it was a testimony to his skill in reading Iraq's diverse 
communities, knowing whom to favour, whom to exclude and when. In 
the immediate aftermath of Iraq's defeat, there was a clear consensus in 
the UN Security Council that Iraq should be prevented from launching 
similar act of aggression in future. To this end, Iraq was required to give 
formal recognition to the independent state of Kuwait, to commit itself 
to pay war reparations and to open up all sites in Iraq for UN inspection 
team searching for evidence of Iraq's suspected programs of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons development.'°' The United Nations 
Security Council passed a resolution 661, on August 6, 1990, to freeze 
Iraqi financial assets abroad and banned imports and exports allowing 
only medical supplies to be imported without restrictions, and, "in 
humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs." As Sarah Graham - Brown 
explains in great details,'^^ the original sanctions regime was modified 
after the ceasefire in April 1991; although Iraq was still not allowed to 
export oil, it was permitted to import foodstuffs and material and 
supplies for essential civilian needs, resolution 687.'°"^ In May 1991, the 
first UNSCOM (United Nations Special Commission on Disarmament) 
team began their work in Iraq, this team was permitted to visit a number 
of sites in Iraq and to search Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons programs.'^'^ Attempts to introduce oil for food programs had 
begun on the United Nations side as early as 1991, but had been 
continuously rejected by Iraq as a boundation on its sovereignty.'°^ The 
oil for food deals was intended by the dominant powers at the UN to 
resolve the paradox. They were meant to keep sanctions in place, whilst 
alleviating the living conditions and health problems inside Iraq that 
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were causing real concerns at the UN and about the economic sanctions, 
given their effects on the weaker sections of the Iraqi population. The 
UN attempted to alleviate some of the hardship suffered by the Iraqi 
population by offering the Iraqi government the opportunity to sell $1.6 
billion worth of oil in 1992 to pay for the import of food and medicine, 
but this was rejected by Saddam Hussein, as this deal included some 30 
percent to pay towards war reparation. 
In 1996 Iraqi government finally agreed to the terms of UN 
Security Council Resolution 986, allowing Iraq to sell $2 billion worth 
of oil every six months for the purchase of supplies for its population 
(this was raised to $ 5.52 billion worth of oil every six months. In UN 
Security Council Resolution 1153 of 1998 and in October 1999 it was 
decided that Iraq was allowed to sell $ 8.3 billion of oil for the period 
May - November 1999)."^^ For, Saddam Hussein, this agreement gave an 
opportunity to keep additional revenues in his hand and this agreement 
made him realize that through this agreement Iraq can be brought back 
to the world market as an oil producer. 
In particular, Iraq has targeted Russia and France as members of 
the UN Security Council which were owed roughly $ 10 billion and $ 7 
billion respectively, by Iraq, largely for weapons purchased during 
1980s. They had every interest therefore, in seeing Iraq's reinstatement 
as a major oil producing power and the Iraqi government reinforced 
these interests by signing a number of agreements with Russian and 
French companies for the development of Iraq's oil industry once 
sanctions were lifted.'°^ These moves were accompanied by other 
diplomatic steps on the part of Iraq. Many of the Gulf countries joined 
hands for the immediate end to US sanctions and rehabilitation of 
Iraq.""^ 
An implementation plan was approved by UN sanctions 
committee in August 1996. It was expected that all the required 
72 
procedures and personnel would be established by mid September, 1996. 
However, the new crisis in US-Iraqi relations in September 1996 caused 
a temporary suspension of UN preparatory work within Iraq and it was 
not until late November that arrangements to monitor oil sales under the 
terms of resolution 986 were completed. Production of oil for export 
under UN supervision began on December 10, 1996. The export of some 
US$ 2,000 million worth of oil was to be permitted over a period of 180 
days and all proceeds were to be paid into the special UN escrow 
account in New York. Of the $ 2,000 million, $ 20 million was allocated 
for the operation of the escrow account, $ 44.32 million for US 
operational and administrative cost, $ 15 million for UNSCOM and $600 
million for UN Compensation Commission (UNCC) for war 
reparations."" 
By the end of May 1997, shortly before the expiry of the first 180 
day - oil for food arrangement, the UN had processed approximately 
US$ 2,110 million worth of oil export contracts, had received nearly $ 
1,750 million in oil sales revenues and had issued a total of $ 466 
million of bank credits to pay for humanitarian supplies. The oil for 
food arrangement was renewed in December 1997 and was revised in 
February 1998 after the UN Security Council approved a plan to 
increase Iraq's export entitlement to US $5,200 million of which $ 3,550 
million was to be spent on humanitarian goods and $1,650 million was 
to finance reparations and UN operations.'" Throughout the period 
between 1994 and 1998 the work of the UNSCOM teams was constantly 
hindered by the Iraqi regime. In December 1999, UNSCOM was 
replaced under Resolution 1284, by a new name UNMOVIC (United 
Nations Monitoring Verification and Inspection Commission). 
After the end of Gulf crisis of 1990-91, Iraq was forced to bow 
down in front of UN Security Council several resolutions, its was forced 
to pay huge war reparations and these economic sanctions of Iraq were 
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only because of the fear that it may not carry out any more invasion of 
the same kind. As Iraq contains the largest reserves of oil, it was also an 
attempt to control its export of oil and to gain maximum benefits. 
Another reason for imposing such huge economic sanction on Iraq was 
to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein, by making his country 
financially weak and disbalanced. These economic sanctions were 
continued till, March 2003, when finally US launched an attack over 
Iraq and overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein. 
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CHAPTER - 3 
Iraq's Changing Political Dynamics Since 2001 
Since 2001 there were several significant international events 
occurred which have greatly influenced Iraqi internal and external 
political life. During the period between 2001 and 2003, there were 
several international occurrences, which touched Iraq at internal or 
external level. 
Internal Condition of Iraq 
Like the other countries of the world, Iraq also has different 
communities mainly Shia, Sunni, Kurds and Christians, but these 
communities have showed different ideologies on different issues in 
Iraq. Since ages these communities have their own separate demands 
and adopted different means to fulfill them. These communities always 
have conflict and differences between them. Numerous difficulties 
confronted the Kingdom in the period after 1932 between these 
communities, like the animosities between Sunni Muslims and the 
powerful Shiite tribes on the Euphrates, which tended to divide and 
embitter political life. Secondly, the problem of relations with the 
Kurds, who wanted a separate state i.e "Kurdish state". In July 1959, 
fighting occurred at Kirkuk between the Kurds supported by PRF and 
the Turcomans, with the result that General Abdul Karim Qasim banned 
the people resistance force.' So it shows there exist a continuous rift 
between the communities in Iraq, each trying to overcome other. 
Kurds in Iraq 
To speak about the history of Kurds, they are tall, fair people, a 
mixture of Turkish and Aryan Pastoral stocks in Iraq. BUT they are 
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deprived of most elementary rights, including right to learn their own 
language at school and to safeguard their cultural identity.^ The 
majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims^ and are also divided tribally, 
geographically, politically, linguistically, religiously and ideologically/ 
The exodus of Kurds from Iran, Iraq and Turkey started from 1980's and 
early 1990's because the Kurds endured mere severe conflicts with the 
state and had suffered persecution from many years.^ Since a988, 
considerably human rights violation against the Kurds in Iraq followed 
by a substantial refugee inflows have led to their prosecution reaching 
the national agenda of international community. 
The life of Kurds in Iraq has been miserable. During World War I, 
Iraq came under mandatory control. It became an independent state in 
1932 but remained under British control until 1958. The British control 
ended with the coup of 1958. Intermittent warfare between the Kurds 
and Iraqi government has been the norms. British policy during this 
period was to encourage Kurdish nationalism, but not to provide 
independence. In July 1959, after the takeover of General Abdul Karim 
Qasim, fighting broke out at Kirkuk between the Kurds, (supported by 
the People Resistance Force) and the Turcomans, with the result that 
General Qasim disbanded the People's Resistance Force. More 
important for the government at Baghdad was the fact that, in March 
1961, a considerable section of the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq 
was in rebellion under Mustafa Barzani, the President of the Democratic 
Party of Kurdistan (DPK), which was established in 1958. The refusal of 
central regime at Baghdad to grant the reiterated Kurdish demands for 
autonomous states had contributed greatly to bringing about the new 
insurrection.^ Mustafa Barzani in March 1961 proclaimed an 
independent Kurdish state. The Kurds were able to consolidate their 
hold over much of the Northern Iraq during the year 1962. The Kurds 
used guirella tactics with much success to isolate and deprive the 
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government garrisons in the North. By December 1963, Kurdish forces 
had advanced South towards the Khanaqin areas and the main road 
linking Iraq with Iran. 
The national claims of the Kurds were to be recognized in a new 
provisional constitution for Iraq. Moreover, a general amnesty was to be 
granted by the Iraqi government. The Kurdish community however, 
refused to lay aside their arms until their political demands had been 
given practical effect. 
The war against Kurds halted for a short while by the ceasefire of 
February 1964. After the ceasefire Kurdish nationalism and language 
received legal recognition, the administration was to be decentralized 
allowing the Kurds to run educational, health and municipal affairs in 
their own areas. The Kurds were given proportional representation in 
parliament, in the cabinet, and various state services, but the Kurdish 
Armed Forces were to be dissolved. Mustafa Barzani, the Kurdish leader 
o 
declared himself to be well disposed towards this proposal. 
In June 1966, the Revolutionary Council Command (RCC) of Iraq 
announced a "peace plan" which the Kurds accepted in principles. In 
March 1970, Iraq announced a complete and constitutional settlement 
with Kurdish issues and a 15 article "Peace Plan" was announced by the 
RCC and Kurdish leaders granting them autonomy within the framework 
of the Republic of Iraq.^ 
Kurdish unity was boosted in February 1971, by the decision of 
Kurdish Revolutionary Party to merge with the Democratic Party of 
Kurdistan (DPK). The deadline for implementation of agreement was 
March 11, 1974. Saddam Hussein, the then Vice President of 
Revolutionary Command Council announced the granting of autonomy 
to the Kurds. Barzani and DPK felt that the Iraqi offered felt short of 
their demand of full representation which included the membership of 
RCC. Between 1970 and 1974, Iraq agreed for the formation of an 
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autonomous Kurdish region. It did grant autonomy for the Kurds and 
carried out democratic reforms. Kurdish language began to be taught in 
Iraqi schools.'" In 1977, Iraq launched a massive economic 
reconstruction programs in the Kurdish areas and invested large sums 
for their industrial and economic development." 
After the outbreak of Iran-Iraq war in 1980, the Kurds became 
more active once again. Iraq was unable to fight war on two fronts. Iraqi 
President Saddam Hussein sent mediators to the Kurdish leaders for 
negotiated settlement. Talks between Iraqi government and the Kurds 
continued for sometimes but no concrete result came out with these 
bilateral negotiations.'^ Moreover in 1987 almost 1000 Kurdish villages 
were destroyed, Forcible resettlements and military actions were 
estimated to have brought the deaths of 100,000 Kurds in Iraq during 
1980's. 
In May 1988, six Kurdish parties led by the KDP announced the 
formation of a broad based coalition which would struggle for the 
liberation and co-operated military with Iran. It was a treacherous step 
by the Kurdish leaders. In fierce battle with Iraqi government forces, the 
Kurds claimed 10,000 square kilo metre of Northern Iraq as a 'Liberal 
Zone'. Iraq reacted violently to this act of treachery and launched a 
campaign for throwing out the Kurds from Iraq. The Kurds appealed for 
the UN to halt forth with forcible steps. There was strong international 
condemnation of the Iraqi decision but the government in Baghdad 
turned deaf ear to all international criticism.'^ 
Kurdish Problem in Iraq after Gulf War (1990-91) 
In 1991 another exodus of Kurds from West Asia began this time 
from Iraq. In the wake of Iraq's defeat in Gulf War realizing the 
weakness of Iraq, the Kurds thought that the time was ripe for making 
demand for an independent Kurdish state. Following the Gulf War 
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(1990-91), Iraqi Kurds joined Shiite Muslim in an anti-government 
uprising, but President Saddam Hussein. The Kurds got some initial 
success occupying Kirkuk, the largest oil field in the world but they had 
underestimated the striking power of the Iraqi army. The Iraqi armed 
forced ruthlessly crushed the Kurdish community and more than 1.5 
million Kurds fled to Turkey or Iran. US tried to establish a "Safe 
Heaven" for the Kurdish refugees inside Northern Iraq, which offered 
military protection to Kurdish refugees.''* 
In 1991, Gulf War and its aftermath highlighted the plight of 
Kurdish people in other neighbouring countries. Internal wars frequently 
resulted in the spillover of conflict or of internal human rights crises 
into neighbouring countries. As a result not only in the outflow of 
refuges but also widening of inter state tension and destabilizing and the 
overthrow of government was the most notorious expellee of Iraq's 
brutal treatment to its own Kurdish population.'^ 
The international reactions to events in Iraq seemed to offer the 
Kurds new hope. For the first time the UN Security Council took the 
important step by declaring, resolution 688, which was specifically 
designed to protect internally displaced Iraqi citizens and to prevent the 
destabilization in neighbouring Turkey, that would have resulted from 
the massive cross border movements of Kurds fleeing the Iraqi forces.'^ 
In December 1992, a member of the Kurdish cabinet elected by 
the Kurdish National Assembly in July 1992, appealed for increased 
Western aid for the Kurdish - controlled area of Northern Iraq. In March 
1993, the Kurdish cabinet elected in July 1992 was dismissed by 
Kurdish National Assembly for its failure in dealing with the crisis in 
the region. 
In January 1995, fighting erupted between DPK and PUK, 
prompting Saddam Hussein to offer on January 16, 1995, to mediate in 
the dispute, and the United Kingdom warned that the conflict might 
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provide Iraq with a pretext to reassert control over the North. As a result 
of the fightings between the Kurdish factions, elections to the Kurdish 
National Assembly were abandoned. There was continuous resentment 
between these two factions of Kurdish communities, the PUK and DPK 
which continued till 2003. The Kurds used their quasi-independence to 
build some enduring institutions reminiscence of the state. At first, 
despite their freedom in the Northern Iraq, the Kurds had considerable 
difficulty in establishing a durable political system. The KDP and PUK 
were intolerant of political pluralism and heavily patrimonial, in that 
each party provided tangible benefits to those who directly supported 
them.'^ 
The Kurds also tends to overestimate the capabilities of their 
guerilla forces. Moreover, two rival peshhmega forces owe allegiance to 
Masud Barzani of KDP and Jalal Talabani of PUK respectively. But 
attempts to merge the two groups have yet not fulfilled. 
From 2001, the Kurds were trying more actively to fulfill their 
dream of separate nation but was crushed every time. As a result, 
despite tensions and disappointments with the coalition, the Kurds felt 
that the best guarantor of their security and interest is the de facto 
alliance with the United States. They thought that US presence in Iraq 
will provide an umbrella under which the Kurds will further develop 
their own institutions and can present their demand to the weak post 
Saddam central state PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan). 
The Kurds found themselves in conflict with the Shia over the 
nature of government power and the country's identity. In spring 2003, 
soon after the downfall of the Ba'thist regime, Barham Salih, the then 
Senior Official in PUK in Sulaymaniah, articulated some of the key 
demands of the Kurds: Kirkuk, democracy. Federation and secularism. 
The Kurds regarded Kirkuk as "Kurdish Jerusalem"" when the Saddam's 
regime fell on April 9, 2003, the main Kurdish political parties the PUK 
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and KDP, fanned into Kirkuk and took over the key installation and 
buildings of the former regime. The success of Kurds in the Iraqi 
election of January 30, 2005 strengthened their position in Kurdistan 
and in Baghdad. The Kurdish authorities have taken upon themselves to 
encourage the over and rapid Kurdification of the Kirkuk city. They 
have provided financial support for Kurds to settle in and around the 
city and changed the names of streets and buildings from Arabic to 
Kurdish language.'^ The Kurds have played an important part in shaping 
the politics of Iraq to a great extent. 
The Shia-Sunni Tension in Iraq 
Another factor which has greatly affected the political life of Iraq 
is Shia Sunni tension since long. Shia political opinion has been shaped 
by the three competing groups; the religious hierarchy based in Najaf 
and Karbala, the urban middle class intellectuals, and a once thriving 
business and merchant class. Since 1920, these desperate groups have 
come to agree on the broad principles around which they have rallied the 
public opinion. The Shia religious hierarchy of Ulama, mobilized rural 
Iraqis against British occupation in the name of Iraqi nationalism during 
the revolt of 1920, while Shia middle class intellectuals helped to shape 
the Ba'th party's nationalist ideology in its formative years. The Shia 
community like the Kurdish community broad secular political platform 
that can provide greater equality and democracy. There was a division 
between Shia community, the ideology of religion was different in Iraq 
under Saddam on the one hand and the ideology of exiled groups in Iran 
and elsewhere on the other hand.'^ 
After the Gulf War (1990-91), Saddam's regime allowed the Shia 
religious establishment to expand its charitable organizations, utilizing 
donations from Shia community. The regime's weakness was exploited 
by Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Nutada al-Sadr;s father) to 
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build a large charitable network stretching from Baghdad to South. He 
emphasized on the Iranian style rule by Islamic Jurist but he was 
murdered by the government in 1999, his son Muqada inherited his 
place.^" 
Shia community was also facing lost of problems in Iraq and were 
totally supported by Iran. To fulfill their demands of gaining power in 
the government, the Shia community joined hands with the US. 
There were always differences between the Shia and Sunni 
communities in Iraq. Both the communities tried to get power and 
establish its own control. In 1979, when Saddam Hussein became 
President of Iraq, he crushed all the opposition by the Shia community 
and never provided them with fulfillment of their demands. As a result, 
the ongoing tension between the Sunni - Shia community got more 
worsened and Shia community to protect its interest in the region got 
itself attracted towards US. 
In 2000 when George Bush became the President of US, he tried 
to mobilize the Kurdish and Shia community against Saddam but 
assuring them to provide all the necessary requirements needed by them. 
But after the regime was overthrown in April 2003, a number of Shia 
clerics and spokesmen made it clear that they expected the US to leave 
Iraq and that it has accomplished the goals upon which everybody had 
agreed to overthrow the Ba'thist regime led by Saddam Hussein. 
The Kurds, who were fighting since ages to get a separate state, 
where thoroughly firm that the US presence in Iraq, will be like an 
umbrella under which the Kurds will further develop their own 
institutions, including the paramilitary pashmerga forces. On the other 
hand, the greatest concern of the Shia was that they were always denied 
of power commensurate and so they also reacted violently against 
Saddam Hussein.^' Both these minorities in Iraq were deprived of their 
rights. As a result both Shia and Kurds joined hands with the US upto a 
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certain extent to fulfill their desires of gaining power in their respected 
regions. 
External Political Dynamics 
On the one hand George W. Bush took charge of the US 
Presidentship in 2001, and he also inherited his father's foreign policy 
legacy towards Iraq. George Bush was firm on his policies, he was of 
the opinion that the United States will remain committed of keeping 
sanctions in place, returning weapons inspection to Iraq and protecting 
the Kurds.^^ 
Since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990-91, Saddam Hussein 
was looked as an enemy for peace and security by many countries. 
Despite of various United Nations sanctions and strategies, Saddam 
Hussein was not removed from his seat. His arrogance, sharp brain 
games and dictatorial rule became the cause of concern for the 
international community. US since beginning was trying to condemn his 
power and to topple the Ba'thist regime from Baghdad. But all attempts 
were failed. After becoming the President of US, Bush's first and 
foremost goal was to remove Saddam Hussein from the seat of power, 
which was mentioned in his so called doctrine of "regime change". In 
his state of the Union address on January 29, 2002, President Bush has 
referred Iraq (including Iran and North Korea) as one of the "axis of 
evils''^ "* and that US would not stand aside as the world most dangerous 
regimes who had been heavily involved in the acquiring and developing 
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of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 
From the very beginning, Iraq was the weakest link in the 'axis of 
evil' and, therefore, much easier to deal with. Indeed, psychologically, 
politically and strategically the problem of Iraq was perceived at all 
levels in the United States since 1991 uncompleted "Operation Desert 
Storm". Firstly, the Iraq has attacked Kuwait and escaped punishment 
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and continued threatening its neighbours. Secondly, Washington was 
convinced that throughout the 90s the regime continued to ignore almost 
all the resolutions of the UN Security Council passed since 1990-91. 
Thirdly, the sanctions proved ineffective; they damaged the vital interest 
of the common people but did no harm to Iraqi leaders. Fourthly, 
Saddam Hussein started claiming a more important role in the Arab 
world by stepping up militant anti-Americanism, fanning anti-Israeli 
feelings and openly supporting Palestinian terrorism by paying $ 25 
thousand to the families of suicide bombers. Fifthly, having got rid of 
US inspection team in 1998, the Iraqi leaders failed to prove beyond 
doubt that they had destroyed chemical weapons the inspectors 
discovered, they were allegedly experimenting with biological 
weapons.^^ In short. United States looked Iraq as a "black hole" where 
all types of WMD were produced. 
Therefore, from the beginning Iraq was considered to be a great 
threat to US in the Middle East. It was the national consensus that 
allowed Bush administration to resort to take measures against Iraq. The 
American defense political &, security establishments regarded the 
Hussein's regime as the direct threat to US security, and its interest in 
Middle East where Israeli-Arab settlement was concerned as well as 
stability of the Gulf monarchies. People in Washington were convinced 
that American control over Iraq would inevitably produce an 
"encirclement effect" on Syria and Iran.^^ 
Furthermore, there were some personal reasons, which made Bush 
administration to go against Iraq. George W. Bush sought to avenge 
Saddam's effort to assassinate his father in Kuwait in 1993 while on a 
visit there. In fact, he said that Saddam Hussein was "a guy that tried to 
kill my dad." So from all these factors it is very clear that there was a 
bitter rivalry between United States and Iraq but openly these two 
countries were not showing their resentment against each other. But, the 
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attack on World Trade Centre on September 11, 2001 has changed the 
whole scenario. The animosities that were growing in the heart of US 
came to the forefront and as a consequence resulted in the war of 2003. 
The immediate response of the US to the 9/11 attacks was 
centered to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, who was seen 
as sponsors and supporters of the Al-Qaeda Movement, that was charged 
with organizing the attacks on United States. The Taliban regime was 
terminated within 3 months after 9/11 and this was seen as a major 
achievement in countering and controlling al-Qaeda, although fighting 
in Afghanistan persisted in 2002, with particularly intensive interactions 
in the early months of that year at Tora Bora.^^ 
It was only after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. 
however, that the US government began an active campaign to force 
Saddam Hussein from power. The Bush administration first tried to 
work through the United Nations Security Council to address the issue 
of WMD, securing the unanimous passage of Resolution 1441, which 
called for unconditional passage of Resolution 1441, and unconditional 
compliances with the long series of UN Security Council resolution 
calling on Saddam Hussein to disarm completely.^° 
Even though the team of US weapons inspections failed to find 
any conclusive evidence of an Iraqi WMD issue and several months of 
increasingly contentions relations between United States and other 
Security Council members, the United States eventually decided to take 
pre-emptive action to remove Saddam Hussein by force, with the 
support and assistance of coalition countries in March 2003. 
Reaction of Iraq to September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attack 
The animosity between Iraq and United States gets reflected in the 
Iraqi reaction to the event of September 11, 2001. Unlike other Persian 
Gulf States who have strongly condemned the massive terrorist attacks 
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on US, Iraq was the only country that did not condemned the attacks, 
due to its antagonism towards the US. Taking a moralistic tone and Iraqi 
commentator observed that the United States is reaping the fruits of its 
crimes against humanity. It is a black day in the history of America 
which is tasting a bitter defeat of its crime and disregard for people's 
will to lead a peaceful life. The collapse of US centers of power is a 
collapse of US policy, which deviates from human values to 
continue to slaughter the Palestinian Arab people and implement US 
plans to dominate the world under the cover of what is called as the new 
(world) order. These are the fruits of new US order. 
The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein also took a holistic stand 
accusing the US, its omissions and commissions of the past. Regarding 
the terrorist attacks, he pointed out that "the United States reaps thorns 
that its rulers have sworn in the world." The United States has harvested 
their lives, not leaving a place without the people there having a 
symbolic monument indicating the criminal action of the United States 
against them. The one who does not want to reap evil must not sow evil. 
Those who consider the lives of their people as precious and dear must 
remember that the lives of people in the world are also precious and dear 
to their families. The United States exports evil, in terms of corruption 
and criminality.^^ 
A noted Iraqi paper had also severely criticized the US acts 
against the entire world. It commented that what happened in US was a 
lesson for all tyrants, despots and veteran criminals, which the rulers of 
America should have expected because they have demonstrated cruelty 
that human beings could not bear. '^* Iraq also identified the US flawed 
structures for these attacks. A web site of the country observed that the 
attack on vital US targets was not an event that occurred in the context 
of the rejection of the policies of hegemony and aggression. What 
happened was actually a faithful reflection of the flawed structure of the 
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imperialist US establishment? The event will leave a profound mark on 
political, military, security and economic structure of the US. It 
undermines the prestige of the country. The imperialist nature of US 
dictated that its basic foundations should be both economic and military 
resources that can be used to exercise hegemony abroad.^^ Thus, the 
terrorist attacks on World Trade Centre (WTC) and Pentagon meant that 
the basic structure of the United States are rejected and targeted as a 
consequence of its ideology.^^ 
The then Iraqi President also warned that the US must exercise 
restraints in its response to the terrorist attacks. He suggested that the 
US should use wisdom and refrain from collaborating with Israel. He 
also emphasized that the US must reconsider its policy regarding the 
Palestinian issue. He said that the US should undertake its 
responsibilities in fairness and justice and by recourse to reason, not 
passion and not by exploiting opportunities and power. It should 
disengage from evil alliance with Israel and Zionist forces. In addition, 
the US should try to use wisdom not force so that their people can live 
with peace and stability. In this context Saddam Hussein made it very 
clear that the use of force is not the only solution to any critical and 
complex problem.^^ On September 17, 2001, in a conversation with 
former Algerian President Ahmad Ben Bella, the Iraqi Vice President 
Taha Yasin Ramdan observed that the US sustained a major defeat in its 
own territory through these attacks. These bombing showed the failure 
of US security, technological, military and intelligence institutions. 
Iraq had been accused of continuing to develop chemical and 
biological weapons. The US turned its attention toward Iraq since the 
September 11, 2001 attacks and made Iraq responsible for the spread of 
anthrax cases in the United States. These diseases could be spread 
through biological agents.'*° In the beginning of the second half of 
November 2001, in a Review Conference of Biological Weapons 
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Convention held at Geneva, the US under Secretary John Boltan, had 
accused several states including Iraq, of developing these weapons of 
mass destruction. An official statement issued by Iraqi Foreign Ministry 
refuted these allegations that Iraq continued its efforts to reproduce and 
remanufacture chemical and biological weapons/ ' It also stressed that 
since 1991, Iraq had continuously been under the heavy vigilance of 
sanctions and UNSCOM which were responsible for destroying and 
dismantling these weapons from Iraq. It was reported that the 
commission had completed its obligations and successfully dismantled 
all these weapons from Iraq. In the same conference Iraqi 
representatives reflected Iraq's involvement and stressed that the US 
was exploiting the use of biological weapons and spread of anthrax as a 
pretext to launch another full fledged war against Iraq.'*^ But, the US on 
the other hand alleged that Iraq was a source of deep concern because of 
its biological programs which it continued even after it endorsed the 
agreement. Therefore, Iraq was bound to close and totally destroy its 
biological programs implemented by UN Security Counci l.'*^  The Iraqi 
representative had criticized the US for its double standard policy 
regarding Israel and other Arab countries. 
The US military campaign in the wake of September 11, 2001 
events and attacks regarding the so called long war against terrorism had 
turned Afghanistan into a big graveyard of mass destruction. Iraq had 
then said that it clearly reflected that the US was no longer using certain 
degree of diplomacy and balance about US foreign policy. In addition, 
Iraq stressed that arrogance and threats has become the favourable and 
favourite approach of the US administration with regard to these 
substantial issues including Iraqi affairs.'*'* An official stated that the 
policy of the Bush administration on Iraq was to continue the blockade 
and embargo despite Iraq having fulfilled its obligations to cooperate 
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with the UN inspection team in order to carry out the task of dismantling 
WMD in the country/^ 
On September 22, 2001, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri 
again expressed similar views on the accusations of Iraqi involvement in 
terrorist attacks against the US, and held Israel responsible for the entire 
episode. He said that " Israel fabricated allegations are in line with the 
world Zionist efforts, in the US and the West, to fuel hatred against 
Arab and Muslim and to ignite western countries to carry our reprisals 
depending on these untrue absurdities/^ Thus, Iraq accused Israel to be 
responsible for the alleged Iraqi link with the terrorist activities. 
The Iraqi government was of the view that terrorism is a very 
critical and complex issue. It held that such an issue needed to be 
addressed at various levels to sort out some solutions of the problem. On 
September 26, 2001 during an interaction with Akhmad, Kadyrov, Head 
of the Chechen Civil Administration, and the Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, the envoy of the Iraqi President had pointed out that 
Iraq did not consider Jihad against the Jews to drive them out of 
Palestine a form of terrorism. He said that terrorism should not be 
confined to what is carried out by individual only but should include 
countries too. Like the US, which was unleashing terror by attacking 
Iraq and killing thousands of innocent civilians.''^ 
On September 29, 2001 the Iraqi President, during a cabinet 
session brought out that evil designs of the West that had been exposed 
since the September 11, 2001 incidents in the US. The West has 
exhibited extreme hatred and rancour towards the Muslims and Arabs, 
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which nobody have ever expected. The West had commited crimes and 
atrocities against the whole world including the Arab nations during the 
colonial era. Hence, Iraq pointed out, this was the outcome of past 
crimes and misdeeds of the US.''^ 
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In regards to terrorism, Iraq, on October 9, 2001 at the OIC 
meeting, had taken a very categorical and clear stand. It has insisted that 
there was a need to reach a unified stand against terrorism.^° During the 
meeting, the Iraqi Foreign Minister Dr. Naji Sabri criticized the US 
threats to expand its terrorist act in future. He argued that the OIC 
should try to ensure that the international community is provisioned 
with an acute and legal definition of terrorism and spell out ways to 
control it on the basis of legal foundations within the framework of 
the UN.^' 
The Iraqi Vice President, Taha Ramadan, has condemned the US 
as the number one terrorist state in the world. In this regard, he stated 
that Iraq had been the victim of continuous US aggressions since the 
Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, he deplored that the US did not consider 
Israelis as terrorists who were continuously carrying out flagrant 
aggression against Palestinians.^^ Iraq also stressed that the US attitude 
was creating an impression that whoever did not follow the US dictates 
and rejected its subservience could be called a terrorist state. 
The UN General Assembly resolution adopted on December 4, 
1989 also called upon all states to fulfill their obligations under 
international law to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in terrorist attacks on other state, or acquiescing in or 
encouraging activities within their territories towards the commission of 
such acts.^^ The UN General Assembly Resolution A 46/51 of December 
1996 also condemned all forms of terrorism including state terrorism, 
but at the same time it also simultaneously affirmed the legitimacy of 
liberation wars.^'* 
According to the Third World perspective on terrorism, a solution 
to the problem of defining terrorism can be found in the root cause of 
terrorism. Thus working on combating terrorism and suppressing 
terrorist bombing the Third World perspective opined that there should 
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be consideration of several issues such as imperialism, colonialism, 
fundamental human rights and foreign occupation.^^ Iraq also seemed to 
had adhered to the same view regarding the definition of international 
terrorism. Iraq urged that the efforts by the international community to 
fight terrorism should be accompanied by activating and respecting 
international law, the UN charter and international agreements. It also 
said that the US may expand the scope of the act of terrorism to include 
other Islamic countries and regimes, ignoring the calls and warning by 
many impartial nations.^^ During an interview with an Al-Jazeera 
correspondent, Naji Sabri repeatedly made it clear that the issues of 
terrorism should be discussed within the framework of UN. He said that 
the US was not the proper venue to discuss international issues, because 
the entire world knew that US could not be fair in discussing any 
international issues.^'' 
Moreover, Iraq kept on insisting that US should combat terrorism 
through UN. It pointed out that there is an international mechanism that 
can be used for this goal, like the UN, which is an agreed upon 
organization, to discuss this issues, agree on the definition of the 
concept of terrorism, agree on specific ways, to deal with it, instead of 
using terrorism as an excuse to settle issues with a religion or specific 
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countries. Iraq also condemned the speech of the US President George 
W. Bush saying that the world hates the US and Britain for their 
arrogant and aggressive policies. The Iraqi President Saddam Hussein 
alleged '"it is the West and America in particular, that created 
fanaticism. This fanaticism will increase because of its aggressive 
policy.^^ He also raised the question as to why Islam is being dragged 
into the whole debate. Islam is a tolerant religion, it teaches lesson of 
love and peace and never promote terrorism and hatred against 
humanitv.*"" 
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So, Iraq showed its open reaction to the attacks on US and these 
open reactions created a sense of hatred in the heart of US against Iraq. 
Reaction of Iraq to US Attack on Afghanistan 
As the US launched military strikes against Afghanistan, Iraq, 
unlike other Persian Gulf Countries, unequivocally decided to condemn 
the US retaliation. Iraq expressed its strong anti-US feeling through 
various statements, demonstrations, official reports etc. 
In a response to US attacks, Iraq severely denounced the air 
strikes carried out by the US and its allies against Afghanistan. In a high 
level meeting, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein alleged "US committed 
an act of aggression against a state and people who are the poorest 
among the countries and people of the world. We will denounce, this act 
not only because America is responsible for it but also because it is 
targeted against the Muslim people and a Muslim country, but also 
because it is an aggressive act that took place outside the framework of 
the international law. Iraq, moreover emphasized that the US may 
increase the use of force in the coming days and it may target other 
countries and figures as it sees fit in order to settle certain scores.^' 
The Iraqi National Assembly pointed out that the aggression of 
the US and its allies carried out against Afghanistan did not bear any 
legal or moral justification. In a statement, the National Assembly raised 
its voice against US for carrying out a spitful aggression against a 
Muslim state and people who were suffering from severe troubles and 
difficulties, and who were the poorest in the world. The act of 
aggression was not in conformity with the UN charter and international 
law. It also demanded avoiding the use of force which was being 
pursued by the US and its allies in the name of combating terrorism.^^ 
The then President Saddam Hussein criticized the US for violating the 
most basic human ethics and people's rights endorsed by the UN charter 
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as well as prisoners' right of Geneva Convention, as it has bombed Arab 
and other non-Arab Afghan Muslim prisoners in Afghanistan. He said 
that US has already been accused of violating ethical norms on several 
occasions i.e. in Japan, Vietnam, Iraq etc. 
Iraq also criticized the US President and its officials who sought 
to capitalize the post September 11, 2001 situation to serve scenario that 
were devised well in advance to achieve its long standing goals and 
objectives in Afghanistan. The purpose of the US aggression does not 
seems to bring to book the Taliban or Osama, but the motives appears to 
change and rewire the geo-political equations of the region in terms of 
serving US interests.^"^ 
The pro-Afghanistan demonstration in Baghdad and other parts of 
the Gulf region towards the US air strikes against the Taliban regime 
and Osama bin Laden showed the strong anti-US feelings among the 
people of the entire area. On October 11, 2001, a popular march took 
place in Baghdad to protest against the US-British aggression on 
Afghanistan, and handed over a letter to the UN representative in Iraq 
addressed to the UN Secretary General. The delegation urged the UN to 
perform a genuine role in stopping the aggression against Afghanistan.^^ 
They also denounced the US-British aggression against the Muslim 
people of Afghanistan. The protestors called on the Arab and Muslim 
government to adopt fair stand towards the US-UK aggression and save 
the people from US terrorist aggression.^^ 
Meanwhile, on October, 2001 the US permanent representative to 
UN called on the Iraqi permanent representative and handed over a letter 
carrying a message from the US to the Iraqi government. In the message, 
the US warned Iraq not to attempt to exploit the situation in 
Afghanistan. Subsequently, in response to the message Iraq 
categorically rejected the warning and urged that the message reflected a 
sense of irresponsibility, arrogance, naivete and silliness.''^ The Iraqi 
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message clearly rejected the logic of threats and stated that Iraq would 
decide its own policies and would not respond to the pressures exercised 
by the United States.^^ 
In a meeting with government officials in Baghdad on October 16, 
2001, the then Iraqi President Saddam Hussein expressed his deep 
concern on the position taken by the Arab countries over the US air 
strikes against Afghanistan.^^ Unlike other Arab countries Iraq had taken 
a different stance and condemned the US attack on Afghanistan. He said 
"I am sad about the image projected by the Arab states governments 
regarding Afghanistan."^*^ 
On October 30, 2001, in a letter to the Western nations and 
governments, the Iraqi President again urged that it was an utmost 
necessity of the time to prevent the US from its aggressive schemes. He 
insisted that the world needed to abort aggressive US schemes, including 
those directed at Afghan people. He also proposed that the US should 
adopt a balanced attitude towards the world, and find the path of 
wisdom. Only then, the world including the US will live in peace and 
security. 
The Iraqi government had emphasized that even after the fall of 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the installation of a US-backed 
government in Kabul, the problems of the Afghan people would remain 
unsolved. The war in Afghanistan would not stop even after the fall of 
the Taliban regime. The Afghan people are inherently inclined to 
fighting for independence. They always fought colonialism in whatever 
form the West or US tried to impose upon them. Iraq had assured that 
these people could continue to fight gorilla warfare against the newly 
formed government. It would, on the other hand provide a new 
opportunity and excuses to the US to exploit the newly emerging 
scenario in the name of eradicating terrorism from its root.^^ 
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The Relation between Iraq and US after 9/11 
The reaction of Iraq, on September 11, 2001 and attacks on 
Afghanistan by US were very bitter and this reaction of Iraq further 
ignited the rivalry between the two countries. Within hours of 
September 11 events, President George W. Bush said "we will make no 
distinction between the terrorist who committed these acts and those 
who harbor them." From that statement Bush shaped a ground strategy 
for the war on terrorism that is as transforming of American policy as 
well as Ronald Regan's pledge to consign a Soviet "evil empire" to the 
"ash heap of history." It was also believed by George W. Bush that war 
against terrorism can not be won if Saddam Hussein continued to rule. 
The terror attack on New York and Washington on September 11, 
2001 changed the whole stage for Bush administration which then found 
itself in a Pearl Harbour situation, under attack rather than being itself 
the aggressor.^"^ Prior to the 9/11 attacks, the Bush policy did not appear 
much different from that of his predessor. When the weapons inspectors 
were thrown out of Iraq in 1998, after some six years of efforts at 
disarming Iraq of its WMD arsenal, the Clinton administration choosed 
not to make this a casus belli, sanctions continued but there seemed 
neither a particular urgency not obvious solution to the conflict. Bush 
appeared inclined to continue the past strategy of pressure on Iraq 
through UN Security Council - no threat of invasion was indicated. 
But after 9/11 these perspectives changed. The risk of Saddam 
Hussein providing terrorist group with weapons out of his still existing 
WMD arsenal became a major challenge for an American administration 
determined never to allow a second 9/11 to happen. By the summer of 
2002, the Bush administration has turned its full attention from 
Afghanistan to Iraq, seeking to mobilize European Union and UN 
support for harder measures.^'* 
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In his state of the Union address in January, 2002, President Bush 
defined the terrorist threat to include unfriendly states seeking to 
develop weapons of mass destruction, because they could pass those 
weapons on the terrorist groups seeking to use them against the Unites 
States. Iraq was named by the President as the 'axis of evil' threatening 
American security. The administration succeeded in garnering American 
public and congressional approval for war, but failed to receive the kind 
of UN mandate that legitimated the first Gulf war. With limited 
international support, the US unilaterally launched a war against Iraq in 
March 2003.^^ 
In the 2002 State of the Union Address and then more clearly in 
The National Security Strategy of the United States, published in 
September that year, the issues of rogue states, weapons of mass 
destruction and terrorism had been forged into one homogeneous threat 
to the security of the American people. The dangers of instability and 
violence were seen to come primarily from the periphery of the 
international system. Bush's new grand strategy located these threats in 
states in the developing world. These states right to sovereignty was 
only to be granted when they had met their responsibilities to the 
international community. These responsibilities concerned the 
suppression of all terrorist activities on their territory, transparent 
banking and trade agreements and the disavowal of WMD. 
The attacks of 9/11 raised the stakes high enough that the Bush 
administration had a low level of tolerance for WMD in a dictator's 
hand, especially one with Saddam's record of aggression. Vice President 
of America Dick Cheney asserted in August 2002: "if the United States 
could have permitted 9/11, we would have no question."''' From this 
perspective irrefutable facts about Iraq's capability and intensions were 
unnecessary. Saddam had given the Bush administration enough reason 
to have serious doubts about his intentions in a post 9/11 environment. 
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As Bush asserted in his January 28, 2003 State of the Union speech, "a 
brutal dictator, with a history of reckless aggression, with ties to 
terrorism, with great potential wealth, will not be permitted to dominate 
a vital region and threaten the United States."^^ On September 28, 2002, 
Bush elaborated on Iraq problem: "the danger to our country is grave 
and growing. The Iraqi regime, possesses biological and chemical 
weapons, is rebuilding facilities to make more and is seeking a 
70 
nuclear bomb, and with fissile material could build one within a year." 
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Even though the links between al-Qaeda and Iraq was tenuous. It 
was Saddam's misfortune that Iraq represented precisely what the Bush 
administration feared after 9/11 a dictator developing WMD with 
connection to terrorist group. Bush described his post 9/11 perception of 
Saddam Hussein in an interview with Bob Woodward: "all his terrible 
features became much more threatening keeping Saddam in a box looked 
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less and less feasible to me." In Rumsfield's words, "we acted because 
we saw the existing evidence in a new light through the prism of our 
experience on September I I , a perspective that was obsessed with 
America's vulnerability to states with WMD and connection to terrorist 
groups.^^ Even the then Secretary of State Collin Powell appeared to be 
persuaded to some extent that Iraq posed a threat, although he may have 
also been playing the role of obedient soldier to the President and Vice 
President. In his crucial speech to the UN on September 12, 2002, 
warned that terrorism had been a tool used by Saddam for decades." 
Saddam was a supporter of terrorism long before these terrorist network 
had a name, and this support continues. The nexus of poisons and terror 
is new. The nexus of Iraq and terror is old. The combination is lethal.^^ 
Meanwhile, President Bush kept on asking for contingency plans 
to attack Iraq if it were shown that Iraq was involved in the attacks or 
sought to exploit the crisis for its own gain. '^* Like Paul Wolfowitz, 
Deputy Secretary of Defense of Bush administration made it known 
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early on that he thought Iraq was involved in the 9/11 attacks^^, and he 
repeated the mantra that Iraq had long standing ties to terrorist groups 
that were capable of and willing to deliver weapons of mass death. His 
information no doubt came, in part, from the CIA on October 7, 2002, 
George Tenet, the then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, sent 
Senator Bob Graham, the Chairman of the Senate selected committee on 
intelligence, unclassified information that indicated the existence of a 
long term relationship between al-Qaeda and Iraq, including solid 
reporting of senior level contacts between Iraq and al-Qaeda going back 
to a decade.^'' 
Immediately after September 11 attacks, some US Officials 
suggested that Iraqi intelligence service has contact with some of the 
people who hijacked the planes that stuck the WTC put the officials did 
not offer any convincing evidence and did not repeat the allegation. 
More importantly, talk of toppling Saddam was an open secret in 
Washington in the spring of 2001, months before September attacks. 
Large segments of the Arab and Muslim world, including some policy 
makers believed that the US administration was using campaign against 
terrorism as a pretext to carry out its own hidden agenda which had 
nothing to do with the war against terrorism.^^ 
This attack of 9/11 sensitized the international community about 
terrorism in such a way that had not been noted before. Many states had 
come together, under the leadership of US, to launch an international 
campaign against terrorism, primarily focused on prevention of these 
activities. The Americans extended their war from Afghanistan to Iraq 
and kept the option open to extend it further.^^ President Bush very 
clearly underlined the US goals when he spokes in the joint session of 
Congress immediately after 9/11 incidents. 
"Our war on terror begins with Al-Qaeda, but does 
not end there. It will not end until every terrorist 
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group of global reach has been found, stopped and 
defeated they want to drive Israel out of Middle 
East. They want to drive Christian and Jews out of 
the vast regions of Asia and Africa."^° 
So, soon after the attack of 9/11, the US fully showed its 
animosity with Iraq and tried to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein by 
hook or by crook. From that day onwards full preparations were began 
to dislodge Saddam Hussein on February 14, 2002, Powel said in a 
testimony that "the United States is working to improve the sanctions on 
the Iraqis", to make sure they do not succeed in the horrible quest to 
develop weapons of mass destruction.^' He also added that the United 
States is examining its option with respect to regime change because the 
Bush administration believes the people of the region, the people of the 
world, and the people of Iraq would be better off with a new regime. 
The US President George Bush asked American people to support 
a continuing war on terrorism that may expand from the shadow of Al-
Qaeda to atleast three nations that he said sought weapons of mass 
destruction. He also warned of "an axis of evil: that he said terrorists 
who claim no nationality but who willing to an ideology, with nations 
trying to develop chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, specifically 
North Korea, Iran and Iraq. 
In March 2002, Bush said that the Iraqi President is a problem and 
he is going to fix him. He said "this is a nation run by a man who is 
willing to kill his own people by using chemical weapons, a man who 
won't let inspectors come into the country, a man who is obviously got 
something to hide. And he is a problem. And we are going to deal with 
him.'-''^ 
Although it was difficult for Bush to take any military action 
against Iraq immediately because there was probability that the then 
President Saddam Hussein might use chemical and biological weapons 
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against American forces and tiieir allies, and those weapons were 
thought to include sarin and VX gas - which attacks the central nervous 
system causing paralysis convulsion and death.^^ On March 14, 2002 the 
US Vice President Dick Cheney began his visit to 12 Middle East 
countries with an aim to acquire international support for the US 
military strike against Iraq. It was also believed that if the United States 
launches a military action against Iraq, the Gulf situation would become 
turbulent and anti US sentiments in the Arab world will get intensified 
which would be unfavourable to the US military existence in the Middle 
East, its oil interest in the region and its dominance in the regional 
affairs.''^ 
In an interview, the then Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz 
has stressed that "Iraq has all preparations to challenge any attack 
launched by the US and Britain in the context of the threat to strike 
Iraq." In a statement in seminar on Iraqi-Lebanese relations, Aziz said 
that "the American-British aggression is expected and we have all 
necessary preparations." America also tried to talk with Kurdish sides 
to topple Saddam Hussein.^^ 
In February 2002, in a speech US Vice Admiral Thomas R. 
Wilson, Director Defense Intelligence Agency said that "Iraq threatens 
the very foundation of the US policy in the Middle East. This clearly 
makes Iraq a very strategic target of US policy." He further added "an 
increased chance that Iraq will be successful in gaining widespread 
support for lifting UN sanctions a development that would likely 
strain our relations with regional and European allies, allow Iraq to 
rearm more rapidly, and ultimately threaten the foundation of our 
Middle Eastern Policy."^^ Wilson further added "Iraq could field ICBMs 
with WMD, presenting a new strategic threat that we've not faced 
before."'*"' After sixteen months since President George Bush took 
office, the efforts to contain Saddam Hussein appeared in danger of 
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collapse United Nations sanctions against his regime were being 
massively violated, and neither exiled UN weapons inspectors nor 
anyone else appeared to had the ability to check his relentless drive to 
acquire weapons of mass destruction. September 11, 2001 attacks 
radically altered the international landscapes and convinced most 
American that international criminals such as Saddam Hussein could no 
longer be allowed to build and stockpiles like chemical and biological 
weapons and seek a nuclear capability. 
In September 2002, in an interview with BBC, Secretary of State 
Colin Powell said "weapons inspectors should return to Iraq as a first 
step in dealing with Saddam Hussein." In response the Iraqi Deputy 
Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz said that "Iraq would consider readmitting 
inspectors in Iraq as part of an agreement to resolve the regime's dispute 
with the United States. Lets solve this comprehensively." 
The President Bush was primarily guided by responsible officials 
and sensitive intelligence information. He had a fundamental obligation 
to protect American people and property by preparing to attack Iraq. " 
In September itself, the senators urged that US President George Bush to 
make a convincing case for taking military action against Iraq and the 
White House announced that the President would meet Congressional 
leaders to make his arguments before confronting Saddam Hussein.'^'* 
George Bush also promised Congressional leaders that he would seek 
congressional support before taking action against Iraq. Secretary of 
State Colin Powel said "he had been trying to calm concerns about 
White House intentions and explore whether a new or enhanced UN 
inspections system would lead to elimination of Iraq's nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons capabilities. He added "it is a very serious issue 
and we are discussing it in a very serious way I think there are lots of 
differences - some are real, some are perceived, some are over hyped." 
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Powel further said, I think you will see the President will pull all these 
strings together and decide how to deal with Iraq."'"^ 
At the same time, Saddam Hussein declared that his country 
would prevail in any war with the United States. In a letter to Iraqi 
people on state television, he said, "victory is in the heart."'"^ 
President George Bush declaration that he would seek congress 
approval to unseat Saddam Hussein amounted to an acknowledgement 
that he could not proceed alone and that he needed to move quickly to 
try to resolve a rift within his administration, with many of his father's 
cautious advisors and with his reluctant allies.'°^ He said, "we're in a 
new era", adding "we spend a lot of time thinking about how best to 
secure for our homeland even further. And this is a debate that American 
people must hear, must understand. And the world must understand as 
well, that its credibility is at stake. 
In an interview, the Vice President Dick Cheney said, "Mr. 
Hussein had the technical expertise to design a nuclear weapon and 
added that intelligence had it that Baghdad was seeking a particular 
aluminium tube for uranium enrichment". "We know we have a part of 
picture and that part of picture tells us that he is, infact actively seeking 
to acquire nuclear weapons." President George Bush also stressed that 
irrespective of the world body's decision on Iraq, the United States will 
reserve the right of a unilateral strike."^^ On September 10, 2002, Ms. 
Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, said that "even if the 
administration lacked firm proof that Iraq was nearing completion of a 
nuclear device, the uncertainty could not justify delay in dealing with 
it.""" 
The then President Saddam Hussein, also accused the United 
States for seeking to destroy Iraq in order to control the Middle East oil. 
Saddam Hussein also accused Washington of "making up problems" 
with Baghdad to promote the interest of Israel which he called "the 
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Zionist entity". Saddam Hussein also declared that Iraq was "clear of all 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons." He further added that "any 
scientific experts accompanied by politicians in welcomed to look for 
weapons of mass destruction." He said "Iraq would provide all facilities 
they need to achieve their objectives."'" 
The President George Bush warned that the United States was 
prepared to act without UN backing against Iraq, including the use of 
military force, without further congressional consultation or approval. 
He said "if the United Nations Security Council won't deal with the 
problems, the United States and some of its allies will." The Bush 
administration asserted that there is an "inherent right" under 
international law to make a unilateral, preemptive attack on Iraq based 
on its "material breach" of a decade of UN resolutions, as well as the 
United States right to defend against the risk that Baghdad will attack 
the United States first. "^ 
In December 2002, the Bush administration told the United 
Nations Security Council that Iraq's declaration of its weapons programs 
falls far short of a full and complete accounting, and suggested that Iraqi 
leader Saddam Hussein had missed his "last chance" to disarm. The 
President's National Security team recommended the United States that 
Iraq has violated UN Security Council resolution 1441 by failing to fully 
account for its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs. The 
UN resolution 1441, calling for Iraq to give a "currently accurate, full 
and complete declaration" of its weapons programs was unanimously 
passed by the Security Council on November 8, 2002."^ 
So, the war of words between President George W. Bush and 
Saddam Hussein was going on and both were trying to prove their own 
superiority. During the period between 2001 and 2003, whole plot was 
created and completed by US to launch an attack on Iraq. Although Iraq 
was given a clean chit on nuclear matters by IAEA, doubts persisted 
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over Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capabilities and its lack of 
cooperation with the inspection process. Regradless, Hans Blix and 
Mohammad El-Baradaei, presented reports in which they confirmed, 
significance progress and Iraqi cooperation while stressing need for 
more time to complete inspection process."'* In the meantime, Iraq had 
expressed its willingness to cooperate with the inspection and provided 
free access to the Presidential sites. Moreover, President Bush signed an 
intelligence order, which directed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
to undertake a comprehensive covert programme to topple Saddam 
Hussein including use force to capture the Iraqi President."^ However, 
the UN inspection was continued for few months but without results. 
The US, therefore, demanded for the withdrawal of the UN inspectors 
and prepared ground for preemptive strike on Iraq. For this purpose the 
US had tried hard to muster the support from its allies and approval of 
UN for its actions, which did not find favour with the International 
Community. However, ultimately US along with some close allies 
started unilateral action on Iraq in March 2003 without the authorization 
of UN Security Council."^ 
Thus, since 2001, the political events like assumption of office of 
President George Bush of US, September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on 
US, subsequent relation of US on Afghanistan and Iraq reaction and 
response to 9/11 and US attack on Afghanistan have profoundly 
influenced the political scene of Iraq. The reaction to 9/11 and US 
attack on Afghanistan has created a serious animosity between US and 
Iraq, which subsequently led to the US preemptive action against Iraq in 
March 2003. 
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CHAPTER - 4 
Iraq's Political Impasse and US Action In 2003 
Since 1990-91, the US despite all its efforts and endeavours by 
using the US sanctions, no fly zone in the North and South of Iraq, UN 
weapons inspectors destroying Iraqi WMD capabilities, regular US-UK 
bombing, support to anti Saddam group, engineering several coup 
attempts, failed to dislodge Saddam Hussein from power. In addition, on 
October 1998 the US Congress enacted Iraqi Liberation Act to replace 
Saddam Hussein regime from Baghdad and allocated a sum of $97 
millions for carrying out the task through covert means. Saddam 
Hussein reacted by debarring the US inspection team to carry out their 
jobs to dismantle the WMD and forced them to pack up and leave Iraq in 
December 1998. As a result, the 'Operation Desert Fox' was launched in 
December 1998 and subsequently the US and its allied were clamoring 
for UN inspection of Iraq's nuclear energy which was withdrawn after 
December 1998. The Iraq crisis of 2003 was a turning point in 
International Politics as it brought radial changes in political and 
security landscape of West Asia after Saddam's fall in April 2003.' 
The relations between the United States and Iraq were not 
constant since 1990-91 and further got worst after the 9/11 attacks. The 
US President Bush's intent to remove Saddam Hussein from power was 
certainly his first and foremost goal in his so called doctrine of regime-
change in Baghdad. The United States offered three key reasons for 
going to war in 2003.^ 
First, the United States was concerned about Iraqi WMD program. 
On August 14, 2002 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice called 
a meeting that laid out US goals in Iraq in a draft of a National Security 
Presidential Directive titled "Iraq: Goals, Objectives and Strategy." 
President Bush signed the directive making it official policy on August 
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29, 2002. The document emphasized the desire of the United States to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein regime in order to eliminate its WMD, to 
end its threat to the region, to create democracy in Iraq, and to contain 
the threat of a WMD attack on the United States or its allies.^ 
In one document, President Bush warned that if the Iraqi regime 
were "able to produce, buy or steal an amount of highly enriched 
uranium a little larger than a single Softball, it could have a nuclear 
weapon in less than a year.""* The administration also described Iraq as 
capable of using WMD against the United States, a position that was not 
shared by the intelligence analysts who wrote the October 2002 national 
intelligence estimate.^ 
On September 28, 2002, Bush elaborated on Iraq problems: "the 
danger to our country is grave and growing. The Iraqi regime possesses 
biological and chemical weapons, is building facilities to make more 
and is seeking a nuclear bomb and with fissile material could 
build one within a year."^ 
The second reason for going to war was Iraq's purported ties to 
terrorism. The administration assertion that Iraq had supported Al-
Qaeda was buoyed by the fact that a majority of Americans believed that 
Saddam was directly involved in the 9/11 attacks. 
Bush blamed Iraq that it was involved in 9/11 attacks,^ and 
repeatedly said that "Iraq had long standing ties to terrorist groups that 
were capable of and willing to deliver weapons of mass deaths."^ In 
addition to the administration's concerns about Iraq possessing WMD 
and having established ties with al-Qaeda, President Bush and his 
advisors had one more reason for going to war with Iraq. It was their 
intention to topple the autocratic regime of Saddam Hussein and to 
democratize Iraq, so that it could then sow the seeds of democracy more 
broadly in the Middle East.'° 
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Other than these three main reasons for going to war, there were 
few other reasons also which compelled the US to launch an attack 
against Iraq in 2003.The United States views access to Persian Gulf oil 
as "vital to US and global Security."" Little evidence exists that it had 
taken action against Iraq to have full control over the oil resources. 
Another potential explanation for invading Iraq was that Vice President 
Cheney, and his contacts in the oil world, could get benefited from large 
oil contracts after Iraq was liberated by American forces. It was believed 
that with America dominating or influencing Iraq, the United States 
could more effectively compete for such contracts with countries such as 
France, Russia and China, who already had a foothold in the Iraqi 
regime. Not only could the United States gets a bigger piece of the pie, 
but the size of the pie itself would expand because Iraq could produce 
far more oil, with the toppling of Saddam Hussein, UN sanctions lifted 
and foreign investment revitalizing Iraq's oil sector. 
Another reason that led President Bush to go to war in Iraq was 
influenced by the fact that his father evicted Saddam Hussein from 
Kuwait in 1991 but left him in power. In this scenario, George W Bush 
Junior invaded Iraq to finish the work that his father started. Bush also 
sought to avenge Saddam's effort to assassinate his father in Kuwait in 
1993 while on a visit to Kuwait.'^ 
President Bush also sought to set his own independent course as a 
determined leader rather than a silent follower of others. It was also 
believed that invading Iraq would benefit the military-industrial 
complex of US, 
So, these were the reasons which made the United States to take 
the decision to go against Iraq. President Bush had several motives 
behind invading Iraq, after the 9/11 attacks, the bitter rivalry between 
the United States and Iraq came to the forefront and as a result US with 
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some close allies started unilateral action against Iraq in March 2003 
without the authorization of UN Security Council. 
The Course of War (2003) 
On March 19, 2003, after giving a deadline for Saddam Hussein to 
leave Iraq within 48 hours, the US and its coalition forces launched 
"Operation Iraqi Freedom" for war against Iraq.' 
During the night of Wednesday, March 19, 2003 before the formal 
start of the concerted air ground assault called Operation Iraqi Freedom 
and effort was made to assassinate Saddam Hussein and his two sons, 
Uday and Qusay, by a precision guided missile and bomb strike at a 
bunker in Baghdad, where, according to the intelligence, the three were 
supposed to be stayed. ^ 
In practice, the original plan for attack got change due to several 
factors. Firstly on the eve of the war the Americans received 
information regarding the whereabouts of Saddam Hussein and his inner 
circle of leadership. This led to the deviation from the original plan and 
an earlier launching of the attack on the night of March 19-20 against 
the targets in Baghdad, while special forces simultaneously penetrated 
the area, especially in Western Iraq. Secondly, the faulty political 
preparation for the campaign resulted in the absence of the expected 
support of the UN and rest of the world, and the staunch opposition of 
key Western powers such as France and Germany. Against this 
backdrop, fear loomed that the massive bombing of targets in Baghdad 
might trigger another wave of global protest. This might have made the 
Americans — apparently bowing to British pressure — avoided 
implementing the "Shock and Awe" concept to its full potential on the 
first days of war.'^ Thirdly, the surprising refusal of Turkey to approve 
the launching of an invasion force from their country impinged on the 
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original plan and forced the American to redeploy in the South, which 
caused a loss of costly days. 
Despite these exigencies, the American set out on March 20,2003 
on a rapid drive from Kuwait to Baghdad, by passing major cities such 
as Umm Qasr and Basra on the way leaving them to the British to 
capture at a slower pace. In a race along the desert axis, the American 
forces completed a 400 kilometer drive in one weak, stopping to 
reorganize the gates of Karbala, less than 100 kilometers from the heart 
of Baghdad.'^ The US took several steps and measures to achieve its 
goals during the war operations 
It took one week for the American forces to reach Karbala and 
arrive at the outskirts of Baghdad, less than 100 kilometers from the city 
centre. Up to this point the Americans had mainly fought in the desert 
without encountering significant Iraqi forces. The advance was halted 
for a number of reasons. The first consideration was logistical, with the 
need to replenish fuel and ammunition supplied following the long 
drive. Second, Iraqi troops that had avoided attacks were encouraged by 
their very survival and began sniping at the Americans. Third, the 
Republican Guard division, the Iraqi regime's main force were deployed 
between the American Army and centre of Baghdad. 
The time required for logistical organization was primarily used 
for the methodical destruction of Republican Guard mainly from the air, 
effected by fighter planes and bombers. The main bombs were Laser 
Guided Bombs (LGB) and Joint Direct Attacks Munitions (JDAM)'^ 
with a Circular Error Probability (CEP)^° of approximately one meter. 
One bomber carrying more than twenty such weapons could unleash 
them over an armoured force. 
While the Iraqi divisions were pounded, the Iraqi air fields, air 
defense positions, radar installation, C centers, and similar targets came 
under attack. Nearly 30 percent of sorties were allocated for 
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infrastructure targets, especially government and communication sites, 
in order to create confusion and strategic blindness among the Iraqi 
leadership Classic infrastructure objectives, such as power stations, 
bridges and dams were hardly ever targeted out of consideration for the 
day after. 
A total of 36,000 sorties were carried out during the war. 14,000 
attack missions, 5,000 missions to establish air supremacy and 
approximately 2,500 intelligence and control missions. Approximately 
another 14,000 were support missions, such as refueling, transportation, 
electronic warfare and so forth.^^ The American Air Command Planned 
into mission not according to the sorties but according to number of 
targets to be attacked. Each aircraft was given an index that represented 
how many targets it could hit in one sortie, depending on its mission 
type and weapon capability. 
The American began moving their forces into Baghdad only after 
verification via satellite, photographs that over 50 percent of the 
Republican Guard division tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery 
defending the city had been eliminated. The American decision of April 
1, 2003 to expand the list of approved targets in Baghdad and increase 
bomb weight undoubtedly had a powerful demoralizing effect on the 
Iraqi forces.^'' On April 3, 2003, two weeks after the opening of ground 
campaign, the US troops seized control of Baghdad's International 
Airport, which is twenty-five kilometers from the city centre. The final 
capture of city took place in the following week. On April 9, 2003, the 
Decisive movement occurred when American troops entered Baghdad's 
main square, and when the statue of Saddam Hussein came crashing 
down live on television before the eyes of the world.^' Parallel to these 
moves, the Americans operated in Western Iraq, mainly with air power 
and Special Forces Units. 
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In attack on Iraq, US also made use of Precision Guided 
Munitions (PGM) which were based on a variety of technologies, 
including GPS, electro-optic guidance , radar guidance and cruise 
missiles of the 19,950 PGM launched approximately one third - 6,642 
were JDAM type (GPS navigated) and one half, 9,180 were laser guided 
bombs. American bombers were equipped with synthetic aperture radar 
(SAR) that allows the target to be seen even through clouds. 
The methods and techniques used by the United States whether in 
ground or air warfare were much better and advance in comparison to 
Iraq, which ultimately led to the capture of Baghdad and overthrow of 
Ba'thist regime by American troops within a very short span of time. 
The Role of United Nations in the Crisis 
Iraq was subjected to intensive arms inspections under the 
auspices of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Security 
Council Resolution 687 (1991).^^ In 1991, an independent panel of 
experts setup by the UN Security Council to evaluate the results of UN 
weapon inspections certified that "in spite of well known difficulties, 
UNSCOM and IAEA have been effective in revealing and destroying 
many its weapons programs.^^ The IAEA also concluded in 1998 "there 
was no indication that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons."^'^ The former 
UNSCOM inspector Scott Ritter state in June 2000 that Iraq no longer 
possessed any significant quantities of chemical or biological agents and 
means to manufacture these agents. The same was true of Iraq's nuclear 
and ballistic capabilities.^' 
Meanwhile, the discussion in the UN Security Council centered on 
whether the process of inspection should be continued since both 
UNMOVIC and IAEA demanded more time to complete the inspection. 
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There were some states like France, Russia, China, Germany and Syria 
who constantly emphasized giving more time for weapons inspection 
and pressed that these have proved results. Further, Hans Blix and 
Mohammad El Baradei urged for more time to complete the process. 
Russia maintained that a political solution to the Iraq crisis was possible 
and there was no need for restoring to force in the issue. These states 
also strongly urged Iraq to cooperate fully the terms of resolution 
1441.^^ 
Moreover, the UN Security Council got divided over the draft 
resolution proposed by the US, UK and Spain which was in the form an 
ultimatum to Iraq.^^ The US, UK and Spain were confident of securing 
the affirmative votes of some uncommitted members of the UN Security 
Council (Cameron, Angola, Guinea, Mexico and Chile) for passage of 
the amended resolution with the required 9 votes, provided no 
permanent member opposed or exercised the veto. There permanent 
members France, Russia and China were not in favour of war with Iraq 
without giving the inspection process due time. They questioned the 
need to have a second resolution. France remained steadfast in opposing 
any resolution that automatically authorized war against Iraq. It also 
contested the US objective of regime change in Iraq which was outside 
the purview of Resolution 1441. Russia also remained critical to the US 
threat of war against Iraq. 
The US tried to justify war against Iraq on moral and political 
consideration. The moral grounds remained disputable because of the 
contentions record of suspicious US intelligence. Operations which 
armed at regime change in Baghdad.^'* On the political front, Iraq had 
demonstrated through reluctantly, to comply with the weapons 
inspection process. But the serious progress in this regard had occurred 
after Resolution 1441. Anti war demonstrations also served as a 
reminder to US and UK that a war to disarm Iraq was not justified 
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unless it is ratified by the UN. Extension of time for inspection in Iraq 
was energetically debated for one week since the March 7, 2003. Hans 
Blix and Mohammad El-Baradei to the UN Security Council. Many 
members of the UN Security Council assessed the ten day final 
extension as a deadline by US as insufficient and inappropriate. 
All efforts of US and UK to convince the UN Security Council 
became futile. Six members of the UN Security Council put forward a 
proposal, giving Iraq 30-45 more days for disarmament process. This 
was rejected by US and indicated "it would be willing to cut down the 
120 days period set for the UN inspectors to complete their work.""^^ 
The US President George W. Bush had maintained that the US was 
committed to go to war against Iraq even if the UN did not give 
sanction. In his view, the Resolution 1441 already provided enough 
opportunity and legitimacy to go on war against Iraq.^^ 
Later on March 17, 2003, Bush said in New York that the window 
of diplomacy was closed and did not go for a vote on the resolution in 
the UN Security Council for the sanction of war against Iraq. The 
avenue of war was opened against Iraq without the UN resolutions. The 
US administration's announcement of an interim authority to administer 
Iraq under the leadership of retired Lt. Gen. Jay Garner also aroused 
interest over the shaping up of the post Saddam Iraq. It was also 
believed that the UN could not be engaged in Iraq under a military 
administration. Yet, the United States and Britain eventually launched 
military action against Iraq without the backing of an additional UN 
resolution. It is not accurate to suggest that the two countries completely 
disregarded the United Nations. Both lobbied other UN Security Council 
members until just before the attack on March 19, 2003, in the hope of 
securing a resolution. 
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Consequences of the War 
Three weeks of "Shock and Awe" carpet bombing on Iraq with the 
help of 1-5 lakhs US and other soldiers in March 2003 led to the 
massive civilian causalities on the Iraqi side. Since the war had no UN 
backing and also due to worldwide opposition to the use of force 
majority of Iraqis saw US and other forces as an occupation army rather 
than as liberators. The mounting civilian deaths during and after the war 
was leading to opposition worldwide, especially in the OIC states for 
continuous occupation of Iraq by the US. 
Dr. David Kay, the US CIA weapons inspector in Iraq resigned 
saying the WMD in Iraq don't exist. He said "what everyone was talking 
about was stockpiles produced after the last Gulf war and I don't think 
there was a large scale production programme in the 1990s." He also 
said that "Iraqi WMD may have been sent to Syria, and that most of 
what US was looking for has been found". 
The fall of Baghdad to US forces on April 9, 2003 with little 
resistance from the Iraqi forces and the subsequent break down of law 
and order, large scale looting and burning of ministries, national 
archives, library, museum, public and private houses and even hospitals 
indicated the scale of disorder, which has descended on Iraq. The US 
soldiers were for completely mute spectators to the widespread loot and 
arson. Initially the only thing they safeguarded was the oil ministry in 
Baghdad and oil fields and installations, clearly revealing their objective 
behind the invasion.''^ 
The lack of power and water supply, together with severe shortage 
of food and medicines and inadequate facilities at several hospitals to 
treat the mounting number of civilians injured in attack after the war 
was declared over on 1*^ ' May 2003 led to the widespread demands for 
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq. 
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Afterwards Paul Bremer, The US civil administrator appointed 25 
members Iraqi Governing council where Iraqi exiles like Ahmad 
Chalabi, Adnan Paschachi and others had been given representation 
including Kurds, Christians and women.'*' 
Post-War Political Scenario in Iraq 
The outcome of a post war debate on the results of the war might 
depended on such factors like the pace of reconstruction, the degree of 
resistance to the US led occupation, the amount of WMD ultimately 
found, if any and whether a new government will be stable or not. Since 
Saddam Hussein's regime vacated Baghdad on April 9, 2003 the same 
US concerns about fragmentation of and instability in Iraq that existed 
since early 1991 resurfaced. Although some Iraqi civilians had 
welcomed US and British troops in occupied areas many Iraqi wanted 
US and British to leave Iraq. The US administration at that crucial time 
said that US forces will stay in Iraq until there is a stable, democratic 
successor regime is established. Senior US officials including Deputy 
Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, said in early April, 2003 that they 
hoped to have a successor regime in place within six months of the fall 
of the Saddam's regime.'*^ 
However, in mid May 2003, US officials apparently fearing that 
existing major groups could not form a stable regime, or that Shiite 
Islamist would dominate backed away from any deadlines for 
establishing an Iraqi self rule authority. 
Shortly after the war, the United States began a process of 
establishing a successor regime. The administration organized an April 
15, 2003 meeting in Nasiriyah of about 100 Iraqis of varying ideologies. 
However. SCIRI, along with several Shiite clerics that has appropriated 
authority through out much of Iraq since the fall of regime boycotted the 
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meeting and called for an Islamic State and the withdrawal of US forces. 
Another meeting of about 250 delegates was held in Baghdad on April 
26, 2003 ending in an agreement to hold a broader meeting, within a 
month, to name an interim Iraqi administration. 
In parallel on April 26, 2003 meeting, the five most important 
exiled opposition groups met with US envoys present: SCIRI, the INC, 
the INA, the PUK and the KDP. On May 9, 2003 the five major parties 
agree to expand their grouping to seven, adding to their ranks the little 
known Nasir Al-Chadirchy, head of a party called the National 
Democratic Party of Iraq, as well as the Shiite Islamist Da'wa Party. 
When the US decided in mid May 2003 to delay self rule, it was the 
seven members "Major Party Grouping" that strongly criticized the US 
decision.''•^ 
In late June, 2003 US administrator for Iraq Paul Bremer appeared 
to again Shift US policy by saying that a planned advisory body of 25 to 
30 Iraqi members would have "real authority from its first day including 
power to nominate ministry heads, recommend policies and oversee a 
process for drafting a new constitution.'''* 
The Governing Council 
On July 13, 2003, the Governing Council was unveiled to the 
Iraqi public, appointed by PAC (coalition provisional authority) but 
reflecting the influence of the seven party grouping, as well as 
prominent Iraqis who were never in exile and were not affiliated with 
the exiled opposition. In late July 2003, the Governing Council decided 
that nine Council members will rotate as Chairperson, each for one 
month. Ibrahim Al-Jafari of the Da'wa Party was the first Chairman, 
followed by Chalabi as next Chairman for the month of September. 
133 
Among its first actions, the Governing Council authorized the 
establishment of an Iraqi war crimes tribunal for Saddam and associates 
accused of major human rights abuses. It empowered a three member 
delegation to seek formal UN recognition. Chalabi, Pachachi and Akila 
al-Hashmi traveled to the United Nations in July 2003 and received a 
supportive statement from Secretary Kofi Annan. 
In early August 2003, the Governing Council appointed INC 
activist Kanaan Makiya to head a 25 person committee that would 
determine the process for drafting the constitution."^^ In early September 
2003, Bremer laid out a seven point plan for returning Iraq to self-rule 
including the possibility of national election within about one year. 
On September 3, 2003, the Governing council took a major step 
by naming 25 members of the cabinet whose factions and ethnicities did 
not belonged to the Governing council. Among prominent figures, KDP 
activist Hoshyar Zebari was named Foreign Minister. Bahar Al Ulum's 
son was named Oil Minister.''^ 
On June 28, 2004, the US occupation authority established an 
interim government in Iraq, two days before the deadline. This interim 
government was composed of men from different sections of Iraqi 
society, handpicked by the US. Before that, the UN Security Council, 
due to intense diplomatic negotiations with the US and British 
government finally adopted Resolution 1546 terming it a legal 
framework of transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people."^^ To the US 
and British governments these steps were significant for the transitional 
period that would usher in a new, Iraq. But ironically, there was no 
mention of when and how the occupation forces would be withdrawn. 
There was rather a consensus among them that security was an essential 
element for a successful completion of their mission.'*^ 
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Elections and its Consequences 
In January2005, the elections were held for transitional Assembly 
for the first time since US occupied Iraq in April 2003/^ In spite of 
interim government and parliamentary election held in January 2005, the 
situation in Iraq remained tense, as theivide along Shia-Sunni, Arab-
Kurds, Kurds-Kurds continue to offer a frustrating picture for an 
integrated Iraq. In the given situation, where the inter-sectarian and 
inter-ethnic relations going berserk resulted into sectarian violence, the 
task of returning peace to Iraq through an elected government in 
Baghdad turned into a nightmare.^° 
During the month of January 2005, the insurgency in Iraq 
continued to gather strength against the earlier predictions from 
Washington that the assault on Fallujah would do it irreversible damage. 
In the period from November to January 2005, the coalition forces lost 
345 troops, 316 of them from the USA. In January alone, US losses were 
107 killed over 500 wounded, the third worst month since the war began 
nearly two years ago. By the end of the month total US losses were 
approaching 1,500 killed and 11,000 injured since the start of the war. 
During the month Iraqi authorities also lost to a great extent in terms of 
human loss.^" 
In the run-up to the election, American and Iraqi planners put into 
an operation a programme to enhance security for the day of election 
itself. The numerous measures included border closures, tight curfew 
and banning of private vehicles from roads. The US military forces 
conducted a series of major convoy operations prior to the election to 
ensure that in the electoral period itself, there would be little need for 
the movements of vulnerable convoys. This measure also meant that the 
US military already reinforced by 15,000 additional troops could divert 
many of its logistics and support units to patrols and other security 
operations. 
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The early indications of the elections were that the transitional 
assembly will be dominated by Shi'a political group, with the Kurds 
having a significant minority. With a boycott by most Sunni- oriented 
parties and a low voter turn-out in central Iraq, the Sunni authorities 
would have minimal role to play in central political development, in 
Iraqi political affairs. 
The Iraq Impasse 
The termination of Saddam Hussein regime came after a brief but 
bitter three week conflict in March-April 2003, that phase of the war 
ended with the American occupation of Baghdad and the disappearance 
of most of the members of the old regime. This was followed by a 
period of instability and insurgency.^^ 
The three months period, after the election from February to April 
2005, was thought to be a key period for understanding whether the 
insurgency would continue to develop or whether the political process 
would undermine support for the insurgents. At the end of those three 
months the conclusion was broadly pessimistic. Indeed the last week of 
April 2005 was marked by a period of sustained violence and the 
previous month saw some 250 members of Iraqi police and security 
forces including many new recruits killed by insurgents. 
Attacks on US forces certainly continued, and also included 
occasional major assaults on US bases sometimes involving more than 
fifty insurgents in a single operation.^'* From the little evidence 
available, only a small minority of the insurgent were from other 
countries. Although there is some evidence that Para-military recruits 
from the Western Gulf states and North Africa enter Iraq for periods of 
weeks or months to gain training and combat experience, before 
returning to their own countries to work in opposition to local elites. 
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Within Iraq, part of tiie insurgency was being mounted by foreign 
Para-militaries, a small faction continued the radical Islamic Para-
military activities that were present during the Saddam Hussein's 
regime. There appears to be large number of supporters coming from 
elements best described as Sunni nationalists. Beyond this, though, 
much of the core of the insurgency stems from Ba'thist elements, many 
of which went to ground in the final days of the old regime. Most of 
them had substantial military training, including insurgency tactics. 
They have massive quantities of weapons and munitions available and 
they believed that they can force the US military to leave Iraq and even 
establish a neo-Ba'thist regime.^^ 
The insurgency was localized in terms of geography and of 
popular national involvement. At its height the Sunni insurgency was 
largely confined to a particular part of the country. Yet the fact can not 
be ignored that the insurgents struck beyond their base locales and 
caused considerable deaths and destruction. The Sunni insurgents have 
argued that they have support among all sections of population. 
Similarly, when Moqtada's insurgency broke out it also remained 
localized. He managed to gain some sympathy and cooperation from 
Sunni insurgents but, more importantly, no nationwide Shia uprising 
occurred. By late 2005 Moqtada had shifted gears and devoted his 
attention to grooming himself as major player in Iraq political scene. 
The Mahdi Army had better training in weapons, but in vicious fire fight 
on October 27, 2005 proved it has no match for Sunni insurgents.^^The 
summer of 2005 saw fighting around Baghdad and at Tall Afar in north 
western Iraq as US forces tried to seal off the Syrian border. This led to 
fighting in the autumn in the small towns of Euphrates valley between 
the capital and that border.^^ 
Meanwhile a referendum was held on October 15, 2005 in which the 
new Iraqi constitution was ratified. An Iraqi national Assembly was 
137 
elected in December with participation from the Sunni, Kurds and 
Shia.^^ Insurgent attacks increased in 2005 with 34,131 recorded 
incidents, compared to a total 26,496 for the previous year.^^ 
Civil War and Permanent Iraqi Government 
The beginning of 2006 was marked by government creation talks, 
growing sectarian violence, and continuous anti-coalition attacks. 
Sectarian violence expanded to a new level of intensity following the al-
Askari Mosque bombing in the Iraqi city of Samarra, on February 22, 
2006. In 2006, the UN described the environment in Iraq as "a civil war 
like situation."^'^ The current permanent government of Iraq took office 
on May 20, 2006 following approval by the members of the Iraqi 
National Assembly. The government succeeded the Iraqi Transitional 
Government which had continued in office in a caretaker capacity until 
the formation of permanent government. 
The Iraqi Study Group Report was released on December 6, 2006. 
Iraqi Study Group, consisted of people from both of the major US 
parties, and was led by the former US Secretary of State James Baker 
and Former Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton. It concluded that 
"the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating, and US forces seems to 
be caught in a mission that has no foreseeable end". The reports 
recommended on the increasing diplomatic measures with Iran and Syria 
and intensifying efforts to train Iraqi troops. On December 18, 2006, a 
Pentagon report informed that insurgent attacks were averaging about 
960 a week, the highest since the reports had begun in 2005.^' In the 
meantime Saddam Hussein was hanged on December 30, 2006 after 
being found guilty of crimes against humanity by an Iraqi Court after a 
year long trial.*'^ 
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u s Troops Surge 
On January 10, 2007 in a television address to the US public, 
Bush proposed 21,500 more troops for Iraq, a job program for Iraqis, 
more reconstruction proposals, and $1.2 billion for these programs. On 
January 23, 2007 in the 2007 state of the Union Address, Bush 
announced deploying reinforcement of more than 20,000 additional 
soldiers and marines to Iraq. 
On February 10, 2007 David Petraeus was made Commander of 
Multi National Force replacing General George Casey. In his new 
position, Petraeus oversaw all coalition forces in Iraq and employed 
them in the new 'surge' strategy, outlined by the Bush administration.^^ 
On May 10, 2007, 144 Iraqi parliamentary members signed a 
legislative petition calling on the United States to set a time table for 
withdrawal. On June 3, 2007, the Iraqi parliament voted 85 to 59 to 
require the Iraqi government to consult with parliament before 
requesting additional extensions of US Security Council mandate for 
coalition operation in Iraq. '^* Despite this, the mandate was renewed on 
December 18, 2007 without the approval of the Iraqi parliament.^^ 
In a speech made to congress on September 10, 2007, Petraeus 
"envisioned the withdrawal of roughly 30,000 US troops by next 
summer, on September 14, 2007 Bush backed a limited withdrawal of 
troops from Baghdad. Bush said 5,700 personnel would be home by 
Christmas 2007, and expected thousand more to return by July, 2008. By 
late 2007, as the US troops surge began to wind down, violence in Iraq 
had begun to decrease from its 2006 events.^^ 
An investigative reporter Bob Woodward cites US government 
sources according to which the US "Surge" was not the primary reason 
for drop in violence in 2007-08. Instead it was due to newer covert 
techniques by the US military and intelligence officials to find target 
and kill insurgents, including working closely with former insurgents. 
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In 2007, tension increased greatly between Iran and Iraqi 
Kurdistan due to latter's giving sanctuary to tiie Militant Kurdish 
Secessionist Group Party for a free life in Kurdistan (PEJAK). 
According to reports, Iran had been shelling PEJAK positions in Iraq 
Kurdistan since August 16, 2007. These tensions further increased with 
an alleged border incursion on August 23, 2007 by Iranian troops who 
attacked several Kurdish villages killing an unknown numbers of 
civilians and militants.^^ Coalition forces also began to target alleged 
Iranian force operating in Iraq, either by arresting or killing its 
members. On November 21, 2007 Lieutenant General James Dubik, 
praised Iran for its contribution to the reduction of violence in Iraq by 
upholding its pledge to stop the flow of weapon explosive and training 
of extremists in Iraq. 
In the fall of 2007, the Turkish military started their right to cross 
the Iraqi Kurdistan border in hot pursuit of PKK militants and began 
shelling Kurdish areas in Iraq and attacking PKK in the Mount Cudi 
region with aircraft. The Turkish parliament approved a resolution 
permitting the military to pursue the PKK in Iraq Kurdistan. In 
November, 2007. Turkish gunship attacked parts on Northern Iran in the 
first such attacks by Turkish aircrafts since the border tension 
escalated.^^ Another series of attacks in mid December, 2007 hit PKK 
targets in the Qandil Zap, Avashin and Hakurk regions. 
The Iraqi Armed Forces 
Throughout 2008, US Officials and independent think tanks began 
to point to make improvement in the security situation, as measured by 
key statistics. According to Brookings Institutions, Iraqi civilians 
fatalities numbered 490 in November 2008 as against 3,500 in January, 
2007. Meanwhile, the proficiency of the Iraqi military increased as it 
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launched a spring offensive against Shia militias which Prime Minister 
Nouri al-Maliki had previously been criticized for allowing to operate. 
This began with a March Operation against the Mahdi Army in Basra, 
which led to fighting in Shia areas, up and down the country, especially 
in Sadr city districts of Baghdad. Progress in Sunni areas continued after 
members of Awakening Movement were transferred from US military to 
Iraqi control.^' In May, the Iraqi Army backed by coalition support 
launched an offensive in Mosul, the last major Iraqi stronghold of al-
Qaeda. Despite detaining thousands of individuals, the offensive failed 
to lead the major long term security improvement in Mosul. 
In the regional dimension, the ongoing conflict between Turkey 
and PKK^^ intensified on February 21, 2008, when Turkey launched a 
ground attack into the Quandil Mountains of Northern Iraq. In this nine 
days long operation, around 10,000 Turkish troops advanced up to 25 
km into Northern Iraq. Both the Iraqi cabinet and Kurdistan regional 
government condemned Turkey's action and called for immediate 
withdrawal of Turkish troops from the region.^^ Subsequently Turkish 
troops withdrew on February 29, 2008. 
At the end of March 2008, the Iraqi Army, with coalition air 
support, launched an offensive dubbed charge of the knights in Basra to 
secure the area from militia. This was the first major operation where 
the Iraqi army did not have direct combat support from conventional 
coalition ground troops. The offensive was opposed by Mahdi army, 
which controlled much of the region.^'* Fighting quickly spread to other 
parts of Iraq including Sadr city, Al-Kut, Al-Hillah and others. 
Following talks with Brig. General Qassem Suleimani, Commander of 
Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the intersession of the Iranian 
government, on March 31, 2008, al-Sadr ordered his followers to 
ceasefire. By May 12, 2008, Basra residents overwhelmly reported a 
substantial improvement in their everyday lives. 
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Speaking before the US Congress on April 8, 2008, General 
Petraeus urged delaying troops withdrawal, saying "I've repeatedly 
noted that we haven't turned any corners, we haven't seen any lights at 
the end of the tunnel,"^^ referencing the comments of President Bush and 
former Vietnam era General William West Moreland. In this regards 
the US-Iraq status of Forces Agreement was approved by the Iraqi 
Government on December 4, 2008. It established that US combat forces 
will withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009 and that all US forces 
will be completely out of Iraq by December 31,2011. 
Several groups of Iraqis protested the passing of the SOFA 
accord,''^ as prolonging and legitimizing the occupation. Tens of 
thousands of Iraqis burned the effigy of George W. Bush in the central 
Baghdad Square where US troops five years before organized a tearing 
down of a statue of Saddam Hussein. Some Iraqis expressed skeptical 
optimism that the US would completely end its presence by 2011. On 
December 4, 2008 Iraq's Presidential Council approved the security pact 
between the US and Iraq. 
Coalition Redeployment 
On January 1, 2009 the United States handed over the control of 
the Green Zone and Saddam Hussein Presidential Palace to the Iraqi 
government in a ceremonial move described by the country's Prime 
Minister as a restoration of Iraq's sovereignty. On January 31, 2009 Iraq 
held provincial elections. The Provincial candidates and those close to 
them faced some political assassinations and attempted assassination, 
and there was also some other violence related to the election. Iraqi 
voters turnout failed to meet the original expectations which were set 
and was the lowest on record in Iraq. But US Ambassador Ryan Crocker 
characterized the turnout as "Large".^^ 
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In the meanwhile Barrack Obama was elected as the new 
President of US. On February 27, 2009, he gave a speech at Marine 
Corps Base Camp Lejeune in the US State of North Carolina announcing 
that the US combat mission in Iraq would end by August 31, 2010. 
Obama declared that this strategy for withdrawal was in line with the 
American goal of 'a full transition to Iraqi responsibility" for the 
sovereign nation of Iraq. He congratulated the Iraqi people and 
government for their "proud resilience is not giving into the forces of 
disunion", but continued that Iraqis would have to remain vigilant 
against those who will insist that Iraq's differences can not be 
reconciled without more killing" even after US withdrawal in 2011. 
On April 9, 2009 the sixth anniversary of Baghdad's fall to 
coalition forces, thousands of Iraqis thronged Baghdad to mark the sixth 
anniversary of the city's fall and to demand the immediate departure of 
coalition forces. On April 30, 2009, the United Kingdom formally ended 
combat operations. Prime Minister Gordon Brown characterized the 
operation in Iraq as success story because of UK troops efforts. Britain 
handed over the control of Basra to the United States Armed Forces. 
The Withdrawal of US forces began at the end of June, with 38 
bases to be handed over to Iraqi forces. On June, 2009 US forces 
withdrew from Baghdad. As a result on November 30, 2009, Iraqi 
Interior Ministry officials reported that the civilian death toll in Iraq fell 
to its lowest level in November since the 2003 invasion.^' 
Given the sign of relief due to low intensity of violence in Iraq on 
June 30 and December 11, 2009, the Iraqi Ministry of Oil awarded 
contracts to international Oil Companies for some of Iraq's oil fields. 
The winning oil companies entered joint ventures with the Iraqi Ministry 
of Oil, and the terms of the awarded contracts included extraction of oil 
for a fixed fee of $1.40 per barrel.^^ In January 2010, Britain withdrew 
it's forces from Iraq. On February 17, 2010, US Secretary of Defense 
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Robert Gates announced that as of September 1, 2010 the name 
"Operation Iraqi Freedom" would be replaced by "Operation New 
Dawn."^^ 
The US, UN and Reconstruction of Iraq 
The UN required a fresh mandate to involve itself beyond the 
humanitarian work in Iraq. The new resolution became a contentions 
issue with France indicating that it will not allow such a resolution 
legitimising the US led war on Iraq. At the same time, French President, 
Jacques Chirac, was emphatic about the need for the UN to be involved 
in the reconstruction and rebuilding of post war Iraq. On May 1, 2003, 
George W. Bush officially declared that major fighting in Iraq was over 
but he did not declare to end war in Iraq. In addition, he urged that the 
war on terrorism had not stopped. The debate over the United Nations 
potential role in post-conflict Iraq generated deep suspicion amongst the 
coalition partners, US and UK on the one hand, and the states opposing 
the war on the other. The latter supported a central role for the UN. It 
may be pointed out that Iraq was subjected to rigrous sanctions for the 
last thirteen years resulting in human misery and tremendous loss to the 
Iraqi economy. The destructions caused by war led to the issue of 
reconstruction and rebuilding of Iraq. The need to involve the UN in this 
exercise would bring legitimacy, impartiality and the involvement of the 
international community. The EU and other donor countries would be 
willing to earmark more funds for the immediate reconstruction of Iraq 
if it is undertaken under the aegis of the UN. 
The US President' Unilateral declaration to stop major fighting in 
Iraq undermined the need to adopt a ceasefire resolution. The US needed 
the UN in order to garner international support for its objectives in Iraq. 
The foremost requirements were the winding up of oil-for-food (OFF) 
Program and the lifting of sanctions against Iraq. Iraq's oil revenues 
were tied up with UN control. The US needed to free the Iraqi oil 
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revenues to pay for the rebuilding of Iraq. There was also an intense 
debate over the question of lifting sanctions on Iraq. 
The UN Security Council adopted resolution 1483 on May 22, 
2003 by 14 votes to nil, as Syria was absent. The UN resolution 1483 
did not give legitimacy to the coalition's act of war on Iraq, but 
recognized the US and UK as 'occupying powers'. In Iraq and said the 
CPA may administer Iraq until an internationally recognized 
representative government established. A framework was established 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, within which the US-led Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) the UN and others in the international 
community were to participate in the administration and reconstruction 
of Iraq. They were to assist the Iraqi people in determining their 
political future, establishing new institutions, and restoring economic 
prosperity.^^ 
The resolution 1483 ended more than thirteen years of sanctions 
on Iraq leaving intact the ban on weapons. It provided for the winding 
up of OFF program in six months and creating a development fund for 
Iraq, where the oil revenues will be deposited. The development fund 
would be monitored by an international board that includes the 
representatives of the UN Secretary General, The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Arab Fund for Social and Economic 
Development and World Bank. The resolution also called for the 
appointment of a special representative of UN Secretary General to Iraq 
for four months to assist in the establishment of a representative 
government in Iraq. The resolution was to be reviewed after one year. 
On May 27. 2003, the US High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Sergio Viera de Mello, was appointed as a Special Envoy of the UN 
Secretary General to Iraq, for four months. The mandate given by 
resolution 1483 to the UN Secretary General's special representative to 
coordinate between the UN and NGO's inside Iraq was to be facilitated 
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by the Council for International Coordination (CIC) created by CPA. 
The CIC was to act as the interface between CPA and the international 
donors. The UN was allowed to receive donor funds separately on the 
condition that it would act in coordination with CIC.^^ On July 13, 2003, 
the coalition provisional authority in Iraq appointed a 25 members Iraqi 
governing council as the first step towards self-rule by the Iraqis. 
The UN Security Council Resolution 1500 passed on August 14, 
2003 established the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) and 
welcomed the creation of the Iraqi Governing Council. The UNAMI was 
authorized to support the UN Secretary General in fulfilling his mandate 
under Resolution 1483 and to consolidate the UN activities. 
The death of UN's top envoy, Sergio Vieira de Mello to Iraq 
precipitated a new crisis in the UN. Questions were raised on the need to 
send UN personnel under US and UK military occupation in Iraq 
without a UN resolution guarantying security to them. The UN was 
engaged ostensibly to stabilize the situation in Iraq and to garner 
international support for its reconstruction. The UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan came under heavy pressure to withdraw UN personnel from 
Iraq due to the insecure environment. 
Unable to guarantee a secure and stable Iraq, the US again embark 
on seeking a new UN resolution which would give the required 
legitimacy to countries like France, Germany, India, Pakistan, Turkey 
etc. to contribute troops to assist in bringing stability in Iraq. The then 
US Deputy Secretary of States, Richard Armitagen hinted at a "planned 
to boost the number of countries sending troops to Iraq while retaining 
US military commands.^^ The 58"" UN General Assembly session, which 
opened on September 23, 2003, provided the platform for the US 
President to ask for broader international support in the stabilization and 
reconstruction of Iraq by providing more troops and wider funding. 
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Another Resolution 1511 was unanimously adopted on October 
16, 2003, signalling the desire of the members of the UN Security 
Council to lend international legitimacy to the occupation of Iraq so that 
reluctant states could contribute financial pledges and troops to 
ultimately help the Iraqi people. The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
appreciated the UN Security Council's commitment "to place the 
interests of the Iraqi people all other considerations".^^ The UN 
Resolution on Iraq, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, gives 
"continue, exclusive American control over Iraq's political affairs and 
the authorization of multinational peace keeping force under American 
control."^° It called upon the UN, acting through the UN Secretary 
General, his special representative to Iraq Lakhdar Brahimi, and the 
UNAMI to strengthen the "vital" role of the UN in Iraq by providing 
humanitarian relief promoting the economic reconstruction of and 
advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions 
for democratic government in Iraq. 
The resolution 1511 also sets a deadline of December 15, 2003 by 
which the Iraqi Governing Council, in consultation with CPA and the 
UN special envoy Lakhdar Brahami was to lay before the UN Security 
Council for review a time table and a program for the drafting of a new 
constitution for Iraq and for holding elections under the constitution.'' 
The resolution also endorsed the US military presence and the plans for 
the gradual transfer for power to Iraqi people. As a result, in the 
subsequent months the Iraq's new constitution was drafted and ratified 
through a referendum. Elections were held and the new government was 
established under the US and UN supervision. Meanwhile, the UN and 
the World Bank also put forth a proposal to setup a trust fund to aid in 
the reconstruction of Iraq. The reconstruction and development fund 
facilities for Iraq were distinct from the development fund for Iraq 
controlled by the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council. This has been 
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done to attract such donors as a European Union, Japan and other 
potential states, which "could contribute either to UN program and 
agencies or the World Bank and specify the type of projects they 
wanted to fund."^^ 
In addition the international conference on reconstruction in Iraq 
held in Madrid between October 23-24, 2003 had a target of US $36 
billions, the cost of rebuilding Iraq over a four year period set forth a 
report issued by the World Bank and the UN.^^ The UN Secretary 
General urged upon the nations to contribute generously towards the 
reconstruction of Iraq. Though, the conference was attended by 
participants from 71 countries and 20 international organizations as well 
as the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council. Despite assurance of 
"broader participation in Iraq's reconstruction" by the US, the 
conference could muster only US$ 13 billion mostly in the form of 
loans. The US Congress however, approved $ 87.5 billion aid package 
for the reconstruction work in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
A CNN report noted that the US led interim government, the CPA 
lasting until 2004 in Iraq had lost $ 8,800,000,000 in the development 
fund for Iraq. The CPA did not establish or implement sufficient 
managerial, financial and contractual controls to ensure that fund were 
used in a transparent manner for the development of infrastructure and 
reconstruction of Iraq.^ "* Despite taking full efforts, UN was not able to 
provide peace and security in Iraq, there is a lot to be done in Iraq for its 
reconstruction and development. 
The Gulf war of 2003, made the condition of Iraq totally worst, 
thousands of peoples lost their lives and most of the population is still 
striving for their survival. Although numerous attempts have been made 
by US and UN for providing Iraq a stable government but still no 
concrete result have come to the forefront. There is an urgent need for 
providing peace in Iraq. 
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CONCLUSION 
Iraq at the Crossroads 
Iraq since ages has been under different forms of catastrophes; 
sometimes these have been internal and sometimes purely external. Iraq 
having the largest reservoirs of oil in the Gulf Region had been an envy 
admiration of the maritime nations of the world. From Mongol invasion 
till the invasion by US, Iraq had been an important target in the West 
Asian region, since so many decades from Ottoman rule till the period of 
Saddam Hussein Iraq has also witnessed the rising and downfall of 
several empires. 
Iraq passed into the hands of Ottomans from Safavids in 1516, 
and Ottomans ruled Iraq till 1958, after which the administration of Iraq 
went straight into the hands of Gen. Abd al Karim Qasim in 1958. This 
government also did not stayed for a long and in 1963 Abd al-Salam 
Arif took over the power. At the same time Ba'th Party gained a lot of 
recognition in Iraq, there was continuous tension between Abd al-Salam 
Arif and his close associates, as a result in 1965, Abd al-Rahman al-
Bazzaz was appointed as Prime Minister and he ruled till August, 1966. 
At this crucial time Abd al-Rahman Arif became the most favourable 
candidate for the post of President and took over the power till 1968. In 
1968, a coup was launched in Iraq for the installation of Ba'thist regime 
in Iraq. On July 17, 1968, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr took over the power 
with Hardal al-Takriti and Salih Mahdi Ammash as his allies. He 
continued to rule Iraq till 1979, until Saddam Hussein took over the 
leadership of Iraq. 
The coming of Saddam Hussein as a ruler in Iraq brought a lot of 
changes not only in the internal arena but also in the external policies of 
Iraq. In 1979, when Saddam Hussein took over the seat, at the same 
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time, revolution took place to overthrow the Shah regime in Iran. At this 
critical stage, when Iran was facing huge problems in the political 
atmosphere, US advised Iraq that it can easily control over Iran. As a 
result Saddam Hussein launched the war in 1980 with Iran which 
continued till 1988. But, the war proved useless, as it provided nothing 
to Iraq or Iran but instead brought with it a huge and enormous amount 
of devastation. 
To overcome his financial losses and to gain more power and 
prestige, Iraq under Saddam Hussein launched an invasion on Kuwait in 
1990-91. US condemned this act of aggression by Iraq and with the help 
of United Nations, passed several resolutions on Iraq during the war, 
Saddam Hussein showing his position in the region rejected some of the 
resolutions but later on accepted some of them. 
Since 1990-91, US Iraq relations became more turbulent. Saddam 
Hussein continuous challenge to US authority further deterioted the 
situation. It is alleged that Saddam Hussein in 1993 made a futile 
attempt to kill the then President George Bush of US. 
Economic sanctions imposed on Iraq at the behest of US further 
isolated it from International community. The sole purpose was to make 
Iraq politically weak and instable. Although the economic isolation 
Made Iraq economically weak. But Saddam Hussein gave an open 
challenge to US Authority. 
The US Iraq relations further worsened when new allegation were 
raised about Iraq secret nuclear programme. The United Nations sent 
many of its inspection teams to Iraq to check the development of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq, but all these inspection 
teams failed to find out any fruitful result. Saddam Hussein by his 
acceptable or unacceptable measures to the international community, 
took Iraq to a new height, and literally became a threat for other 
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countries. The bitter relations between the two Nations continued even 
after the change government in US 
George. Bush, who's first and foremost goal after assuming power 
was to remove Saddam Hussein from power. President Bush declared 
Iraq, Iran and North Korea as 'axis of evil', and declared an open war 
against Iraq. 
The situation became volatile with the infamous 9/11 terrorist 
attacks on WTC and the Pentagon, US in retaliation launched operation 
Enduring freedom against Afghanistan on the pretext that it was 
responsible for the attack on US. Iraq openly condemned the US action. 
Now, US became the open enemy of Iraq and tried to dislodge Saddam 
Hussein from Iraq at the earliest. For attaining the desired result, US 
took both rigid and flexible measures. 
US with allies launched a war on Iraq in March 2003. The US 
presented several reasons for its attack of Iraq, important among them 
were restoring Democracy, US was skeptical that Iraq was having WMD 
which if used can cause huge damage to the world. But these two 
reasons were not true to the fuller extent; in reality President Bush had 
personal differences with Saddam Hussein also among others the most 
important reason Iraq's rich oil resources. Defying International Law 
and United Nations US and its allies attacked Iraq. 
To gain success the US President George W. Bush took help of 
the internal politics in Iraq. Iraq has been always marred by sectarian 
differences between Shia and Sunnis and the powerful Kurds whose 
voice have always been crushed by defiant Saddam 
US took the advantage of this situation and promised several 
incentives to different sects in compromise formula that with the defeat 
of Saddam Hussein they will be given more power and prestige. 
Another major issue in Iraq was the issue of Kurds who have 
been demanding their own separate state but their demand was crushed 
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by an iron hand during Saddam Hussein regime against .Taking 
advantage of the animosity between Saddam Hussein and the dejected 
sectarian communities US planned a massive attack on Iraq promising 
these communities political mileage. 
The US government was successful in dislodging and later 
capturing. Saddam Hussein in December 2003 later he was executed in 
December 2006. The US led invasion on Iraq got a lot of criticism from 
all over the world; even the American people themselves criticized this 
US act of aggression. 
The policies of Saddam Hussein never favoured US interest in the 
Gulf region. His power and authority made Iraq an important part of the 
Gulf region. As Saddam Hussein was unbridled in the development of 
Iraq, without the consent or consideration of US, this was not digestible 
to the US authority, that a small country like Iraq should raise head 
against it. 
The political atmosphere of Iraq since 2001 had seen so many ups 
and downs. There is no proper system of government in Iraq. People are 
living very miserable life. It's true that when Saddam Hussein was 
ruling in Iraq, there were some problems in Iraq, but theses problems 
were not on a large scale like the present ones, people were not leading 
such a miserable life like now they are surviving. It is very clear from 
the unilateral action by US on Iraq that whatever US presented to prove 
itself correct, the story was the other way round. 
It was not democracy, it was not terrorism, it was not even the 
issue of WMD but it was only a threat that Saddam Hussein may hamper 
the US interest in Gulf region. He didn't allow US to rule Iraq, till he 
was alive. So, these all conditions got mingled and US finally led an 
attack on Iraq. Both the United Nations and US are trying to cope up 
with the ongoing situation in Iraq, work of reconstruction is going on in 
full swing but still there is no better result. 
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Since the invasion of Iraq there is chaos and disorder everywhere 
in Iraq. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq was developing at a significant rate 
but after Saddam Hussein Iraq has lost its position in the international 
community, the elected government of Iraq is just like the puppet in the 
hands of US, there is no proper system in the administration. Iraq to 
regain its lost position needs lots of international support. It is the work 
of UN and the international community to come forward in helping Iraq. 
The situation in Iraq after the series of turmoil still remains fluid. 
Massive loss of men and material has left a deep scar on the people of 
Iraq. Political issues in Iraq remain unanswered. It is hoped with 
Democrats coming to power in US and international community together 
withstand for bringing stability and peace in Iraq. 
The 9/11 attacks further deteriorated the situation and relations 
between Iraq and US became worse. After 9/11 President George W. 
Bush considered every Muslim country as an enemy of US and his 
biggest threat was Saddam Hussein. Although no link were found 
between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda but US on the pretext of 
combating terrorism and providing democracy invaded Iraq. It is very 
clear now that the invasion of Iraq was not meant only to dislodge 
Saddam Hussein and to control its oil resources but to prove US 
hegemony over the world. 
The US did not considered the advice of the UN before the 
invasion on Iraq, this also shows that US showed a very lewd behaviour 
and wanted to prove in front of the international community that no 
organization or country is bigger than the US. After the Gulf War of 
2003, there was so much of Mayhem and havoc in Iraq that till now US 
is not able to handle the situation in Iraq. 
Although US was successful in bringing down the long and 
arduous dictatorship of Saddam Hus sein but for the US the battle was 
half over. Unilateral action on Iraq in 2003 provided nothing but only 
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devastation and bloodshed in Iraq. There was a heavy casualty on both 
the sides. The Gulf war of 2003 also gave birth to several insurgency 
groups in Iraq.US was also criticized for its policy on Iraq both at the 
international as well as within the country. The US allegation of WMD 
also turned out to be false with UN giving a clean chit to Iraq. In 
January 2010, British Prime Minister Tony Blair admitted that there was 
no issue of WMD in invading Iraq, but as Britain being an ally of US 
wanted to remove Saddam Hussein from power. 
Elections were held in 2005 in Iraq. But the puppet government 
installed by US could not control the sectarian differences among Shia-
Sunni, Arab-Kurds, and political situation became more unpredictable. 
The task of returning peace in Iraq through an elected government 
turned into a nightmare. 
People of Iraq are living a very terrible life; they are facing a 
number of problems. The internal condition of Iraq is also very pathetic. 
There is continuous fight between the different communities in Iraq, but 
after the coming of President Barrack Obama in 2009, the situations in 
Iraq have become a little better. The President of US has ordered the 
withdrawal of US troops from Iraq at an early date. 
Post Saddam Hussein Iraq has become more unstable US has paid 
a heavy price, it has lost support of its own people and International 
community. Moreover, UN Security Council has realized the US 
intention behind its action on Iraq. 
The US goal of establishing democracy remains unaccomplished. 
The US intentions and motives are rather open and evident to exploit the 
resources (oil) of Iraq in the name of establishing democratic political 
system in Baghdad. Continuous military attacks on innocent Iraqis 
people have left on physical and emotional mark on Iraq. There are 
several questions still remain unanswered regarding the fate of Iraqi 
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people, the newly emerged democratic political system and the future of 
Iraq. 
At present Iraq is on the crossroads. In post Saddam period, the 
future of Iraq is unstable and unpredictable due to sectarian fighting 
among various groups, despite the huge efforts by the new government 
supported by US. The occupying forces are trying to tighten the 
activities of insurgents who are posing many challenges to peace and 
stability of Iraq, by resorting violence in the name of sectarian divisions. 
Henceforth, it is high time that the people of Iraq and international 
community take some stern and decisive measures against those who are 
responsible for plight and problems of Iraq. 
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